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This dissertation investigates the dynamics of evolutionary games based on the framework of
interacting particle systems in which individuals are discrete, space is explicit, and dynamics are
stochastic. Its focus is on 2-strategy games played on a d-dimensional integer lattice with a range of
interaction M . An overview of related past work is given along with a summary of the dynamics
in the mean-field model, which is described by the replicator equation. Then the dynamics of
the interacting particle system is considered, first when individuals are updated according to the
best-response update process and then the death-birth update process. Several interesting results
are derived, and the differences between the interacting particle system model and the replicator
dynamics are emphasized. The terms selfish and altruistic are defined according to a certain ordering
of payoff parameters. In these terms, the replicator dynamics are simple: coexistence occurs if both
strategies are altruistic; the selfish strategy wins if one strategy is selfish and the other is altruistic;
and there is bistability if both strategies are selfish. Under the best-response update process, it is
shown that there is no bistability region. Instead, in the presence of at least one selfish strategy,
the most selfish strategy wins, while there is still coexistence if both strategies are altruistic. Under
the death-birth update process, it is shown that regardless of the range of interactions and the
dimension, regions of coexistence and bistability are both reduced. Additionally, coexistence occurs
in some parameter region for large enough interaction ranges. Finally, in contrast with the replicator
equation and the best-response update process, cooperators can win in the prisoner’s dilemma for
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Chapter 1
THE FRAMEWORK OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
1.1 The Origin of Evolutionary Game Theory
Game Theory originated in its modern form with the foundational work of John Von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), which developed a mathematical framework
for studying human behavior and optimal strategies in strategic games. The theory gained popularity
and influence with John Nash’s seminal work, which defined and proved the existence of a particular
sort of equilibrium. An equilibrium of this kind would come to be known as a Nash equilibrium
(Nash 1950).
In the century prior to this development of game theory, Charles Darwin introduced the notion of
natural selection as the pathway of evolutionary change through descent with modification (Darwin
1876). In The Origins of Species, he described an individual’s fitness as the propensity for the
individual’s traits to be passed into the next generation. This fitness depends, of course, on how well
the individual survives and reproduces in its particular natural environment, but it also depends very
importantly on how the individual interacts with others in the environment. This dependence on
how individuals benefit or damage the fitness of others has led scientists and mathematicians alike
to consider game theoretic pressures on evolution. In this setting, instead of trying to understand
optimal strategies for rational players in a strategic game, we use game theory to understand the
fixation of optimal (or suboptimal) traits in a population. John Maynard Smith and George R. Price
in their pioneering 1973 article, The Logic of Animal Conflict, helped to unite evolutionary theory
with the methods of game theory by defining an “evolutionarily stable strategy,” or ESS (Maynard
Smith and Price 1973). Evolutionary game theory originated as a framework for understanding
biological evolution, but it has also been applied to economics (Friedman 1991) and other social
sciences (Axelrod 1986; Nowak, Komarova, and Niyogi 2001) where traditional game theory has its
roots.
A critical issue in evolutionary biology is understanding how the mechanisms at work in the
evolutionary process influence the eventual outcome of evolution in a population. Evolutionary
game theory approaches these questions by clearly defining how interactions between individuals
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will result in certain payoffs. By relating these payoffs to a Darwinian notion of fitness, evolutionary
outcomes can be predicted in a variety of models. Traditionally, these models have ignored the
effects of localized interactions and the process by which interactions are initiated (Lawlor and Smith
1976; Vincent and Brown 2005), as in the case of the popular replicator equation, and more recent
selection-mutation models such as in Cleveland and Ackleh 2013. For a survey of deterministic,
non-spatial evolutionary games, the reader is directed to Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998. However,
stochastic and spatial processes have been shown to dramatically affect the evolutionary process,
both in theory (Nowak, Bonhoeffer, and May 1994a; Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006; Kang and Lanchier
2012), and in observations of nature (Bolnick and Fitzpatrick 2007; Kerr et al. 2002). For a review of
some spatial evolutionary games, the reader is directed to chapters 9-13 of Nowak 2006.
1.2 Two Strategy Symmetric Games
The most popularly studied games, and the ones studied in this work, are symmetric games
with two available strategies. A symmetric game is one in which each player has the same set of
strategies available to them, and the payoffs depend only on the strategies being played, not on which
players are using the strategy. In this case, the payoffs can be summarized by a two-by-two payoff
matrix A = (aij) where aij is the payoff received by a player playing strategy i when playing against
someone playing strategy j, with i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The payoff matrix, therefore, has four parameters.
The ordering of these parameters characterizes the game. We assume without loss of generality that
strategy 1 is the strategy that satisfies a21 > a12. There are 4! = 24 orderings of the parameters, but
there is not yet any distinction between strategies 1 and 2. Taking account for this symmetry, there
are 12 distinct games. We now introduce the most popular two strategy symmetric games. Figure 1
accompanies the descriptions below to give an overview of how the strategies for each game fit into
our evolutionary game models. Figure 2 exhibits how each game fits into a phase portrait of payoff
parameters in the a11, a22–plane.
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Game Strategy 1 Strategy 2
stag hunt hare-hunter stag-hunter
harmony game cooperate defect
deadlock game cooperate defect
prisoner’s dilemma cooperate defect
hawk-dove game dove hawk
battle of the sexes partner’s preference own preference
leader game follower leader
Figure 1: A list of some two-player two-strategy games, the strategies involved, and the ordering of
the strategies that ensures the a21 > a12 constraint is satisfied.
a11



















Figure 2: A phase portrait demonstrating the parameter region associated to each two-player, two-
strategy game. BS = Battle of the Sexes. DL = Deadlock. PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The prisoner’s dilemma is the most popularly studied symmetric two person game, and it
represents social dilemmas faced in many real-world situations. The dilemma is typically described
by a narrative in which two prisoners, say Alice and Bill, are being held for trial. They have each
been brought in on a minor charge, but are suspected of committing a greater crime. The detective
offers each, individually, a deal. If Alice will testify against Bill for the greater crime, then Alice will
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be acquitted of the lesser charge. The same deal is offered to Bill for testifying against Alice. Alice
and Bill have a dilemma. If they cooperate with one another (neither testifies), then they each get
the light sentence for the minor crime they have been arrested for. This light sentence is referred to
as the reward payoff, R, a reward for mutual cooperation. But Alice serves her own best interest
by testifying against Bill. As long as Bill does not also testify, then Alice has reduced her sentence.
This reduced sentence is referred to as the temptation payoff, T . Bill’s sentence in this case is the
worst possible and is referred to as the sucker’s payoff, S. He does not get the benefit from having
testified against Alice, so he receives a sentence for both crimes. Bill clearly wants to avoid this
situation, so he is inclined to testify against Alice as well. In the case that both testify, they both
receive the sentence for the greater crime, but are released from the lesser sentence. We refer to
this as the punishment payoff, P , a punishment for mutual defection. The payoffs are ordered as
T > R > P > S. If we consider cooperation to be strategy 1 and defection to be strategy 2, then this
payoff ordering is a21 > a11 > a22 > a12. The only Nash equilibrium for this game is defection, but
defection is clearly not the socially optimal strategy. In a non-spatial model of evolutionary games,
the defectors always win, but we will show that for one of the spatial game models, cooperators will
win in a subset of the prisoner’s dilemma region.
Deadlock Game
The Deadlock game is identical to the Prisoner’s Dilemma except that the payoff to mutual
defectors is greater than the payoff to mutual cooperators. Thus, the payoffs are ordered as
T > P > R > S, and there is no longer a dilemma; cooperation always leads to a lower payoff than
defection regardless of whether the cooperation is mutual or not. As might be expected, for the
Deadlock game, defectors win in both the non-spatial and spatial models examined in the following
chapters.
Harmony Game
The Harmony game is another game of cooperators and defectors. Suppose that two players
share common property, which is threatened to be damaged by an imminent storm. If the two work
together (cooperate), they can secure the property and avoid any damage. This results in the greatest
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payoff a11. An individual may choose not to work (defect) because the work is difficult, but then the
property will only be partially secured and it will suffer some damage, which both individuals would
equally like to avoid. The defector would receive a higher payoff than the cooperator, because both
experienced the damage, but the defector at least didn’t have to work. Thus, a21 > a12. If both
individuals defect by choosing not to work, then the property is a total loss, resulting in the smallest
payoff a22. So the payoff ordering for the Harmony Game is a11 > a21 > a12 > a22.
Hawk-Dove Game
Another popular symmetric two-person, two-strategy game is the Hawk-Dove game, first for-
mulated in Maynard Smith and Price 1973. In this game, the two players are either playing as an
aggressive hawk or a passive dove when they encounter each other at a food source, which they would
both like to have. If both players are doves, they will share the food peaceably and each get half, a
payoff of V/2. Calling the doves strategy 1, this means a11 = V/2. If both are hawks, they fight
until one sustains an injury. The uninjured one gets the food, a payoff of V , and the injured one
gets nothing but an injury, a payoff of −C. Assuming each hawk is evenly matched, the expected
payoff to a hawk is (V − C)/2 = a22 when encountering another hawk. The benefit to being a hawk
comes when meeting a dove. The dove chooses not to fight, a payoff of 0 = a12, and the hawk gets
the entire payoff V = a21. If V > C, this is equivalent to a prisoner’s dilemma. It is only referred to
as a hawk-dove game if V < C, in which case the payoffs are ordered as a21 > a11 > a12 > a22. Any
game with this payoff ordering is considered a hawk-dove game. This game has also been formulated
using different narratives, and may be referred to as the game of chicken or the snowdrift game
according to the story in mind. In the non-spatial replicator equation, a hawk-dove game always
results in coexistence, but in the spatial games it is possible for either hawks or doves to win.
Stag Hunt Game
The stag hunt game is a fifth popular symmetric two-person, two-strategy game. The stag hunt
is a dilemma between safety and social cooperation. In it a pair of hunters must choose to either
hunt a stag or a hare. They would each prefer to fell a stag, but it will require both cooperating
in order to do so. The hare can be caught without cooperation. If one leaves his home with
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stag-hunting gear and the other leaves his home with hare-hunting gear, the stag-hunter will catch
neither and will starve, receiving the lowest payoff L, while the hare-hunter will eat the non-optimal,
but adequate hare, a payoff H. If both leave their homes with stag-hunting gear, they will each
eat the stag and receive the optimal payoff S. Calling strategy 1 the strategy of stag-hunting,
then a11 = S > a21 = H = a22 > a12 = L. More generally, a game with the payoff ordering
a11 > a21 > a22 > a12 is also considered a stag hunt game. In replicator dynamics, the stag hunt
game is a region of bistability: either all hunters will become stag-hunters or all hunters will become
hare-hunters. Which strategy wins depends on the initial density of the strategy. However, in the
spatial game models, this is not typically the case. For instance, in best response dynamics, it is
true that all hunters will become either stag-hunters or all hunters will become hare-hunters, but the
strategy that dominates is determined strictly by the payoffs and is independent of initial densities.
Battle of the Sexes
The battle of the sexes is a game in which the two players, say Alice and Bill, are imagined to
be planning for a date. Alice would prefer to attend the opera, and Bill would prefer to attend the
football game, but each prefers most of all to be with the other. This creates a situation in which if
they both act altruistically (Alice choosing to attend the football game and Bill choosing to attend
the opera), then they end up neither being together nor being at the event they were interested in.
Letting strategy 1 be the strategy of altruism, a11 is the lowest payoff available. On the other hand,
if they are both selfish and attend their own preferred event, hoping that their partner will do the
same, then they end up with a slightly higher payoff for attending an interesting event but being
alone, a22. The optimal payoff is awarded if one chooses the selfish strategy and the other chooses
the altruistic strategy. In this case, they end up at the event together. The selfish player gets the
highest payoff a21 and the altruistic player gets the next highest payoff a12. Thus the battle of the
sexes game is seen as the game with payoff ordering a21 > a12 > a22 > a11. The battle of the sexes is
another game for which both strategies always coexist for the non-spatial game, but for some of the
spatial game models, the region is divided between areas of coexistence and areas where the selfish
strategy wins (driving out the altruistic strategy and making social optimality impossible).
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Leader Game
The Leader game named in Rapoport 1967 is a game in which the two players are assumed to
meet and then choose a leader, typically without communication. A standard framing of the game is
to assume that each player drives a car and both arrive at opposite ends of a one-lane bridge. They
must then determine who will go first, but without the presence of a standard rule for determining
right-of-way. Each driver may choose one of two strategies: either to concede the right of way or
to assert their right of way. The best situation is for one driver to assert and the other to concede.
In this case, the assertive driver (leader) receives the highest available payoff, L, for the leader.
The conceding driver (follower) receives the next highest available payoff, F, for the follower. A
less optimal payoff, D for delay, is given if both drivers concede the right of way, while the worst
payoff, A, is given in the socially awkward case that both drivers assert their right of way. With
concession being called strategy 1 and assertion being strategy 2, this results in the payoff ordering
a21 > a12 > a11 > a22. In the non-spatial (well-mixed) model of evolutionary games, this game
results in coexistence between the two strategies. However, in some of the spatial models studied
here, it can be shown that for different parameter choices, the population may approach a state of
all-leaders or a state of all-followers.
An alternative view of this parameter region is to frame it as a division of labor game. As such,
we consider two players to be working together in a productive process. Each player may choose
either to focus on sustenance (i.e. farming) or to focus on innovation (i.e. developing new farm tools).
The task of sustenance is less desirable than the task of innovation, but both players benefit most
from having one sustainer (strategy 1) and one innovator (strategy 2). If both players are innovators,
then there is no one to provide the sustenance, resulting in the lowest payoff a22. If both players are
sustainers, then they are both content but not working optimally. This results in the next lowest
payoff, a11. Since sustenance is less desirable than innovation, but division of labor is preferred over
the alternative, then a21 > a12 > a11 > a22.
1.3 The Replicator Equation
A typical method for studying evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed populations is to use the
replicator equation, which was introduced in Taylor and Jonker 1978 and studied further and named
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in Schuster and Sigmund 1983. Since our proposed study focuses on evolutionary games with two
possible strategies, we will focus on that setting when describing the replicator equation. In this
approach, the payoff a player receives from each game they play is taken to represent the player’s
fitness, and is frequency-dependent. Letting ui be the proportion of players using strategy i, the
payoff of each type i player is given according to the payoff matrix by
φi(u1, u2) = ai1u1 + ai2u2 for i = 1, 2.
Treating this payoff as the growth rate for the set of players of strategy i, the replicator equation
describes the evolution as
u˙i = ui (φi(u1, u2)− [φ1(u1, u2)u1 + φ2(u1, u2)u2]) .
Applying the expression for φi and using the fact that u2 = 1 − u1, we arrive at the replicator
equation describing the proportion of type 1 players:
u˙1 = u1 (φ1(u1, u2)− φ2(u1, u2)− [φ1(u1, u2)− φ2(u1, u2)]u1)
= u1(1− u1) [φ1(u1, u2)− φ2(u1, u2)]
= u1(1− u1) [(a11 − a21)u1 + (a12 − a22)u2]
= u1(1− u1) [(a11 − a21 − a12 + a22)u1 − (a22 − a12)] .
We introduce the notation
a1 := a11 − a21 and a2 := a22 − a12
and some clarifying terminology by saying that strategy i is:
• altruistic if ai < 0 in the sense that a player with strategy i confers a greater payoff to players
of the opposite strategy than to players of her own strategy,
• selfish if ai > 0 in the sense that a player with strategy i confers a greater payoff to players of
her own strategy than to players of the opposite strategy.
In these terms, the replicator equation for the proportion of type 1 players becomes
u˙1 = u1(1− u1) [(a1 + a2)u1 − (a2)] , (1.1)
which has three fixed points:
e1 := 1, e2 := 0, and e12 = a2(a1 + a2)−1.
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Some basic analysis shows that the limiting behavior of u1 depends only on the signs of a1 and a2,
and can be summarized by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 For the replicator equation 1.1, with
e1 := 1, e2 := 0, and e12 = a2(a1 + a2)−1,
the limiting behavior of u1 is as follows:
a) If both strategies are selfish (a1, a2 > 0), then e12 is unstable and u1 converges to e1 or e2,
depending on whether u1 is initially larger or smaller than e12. Thus, the system is bistable.
b) If both strategies are altruistic (a1, a2 < 0), then e12 is globally stable, so u1 converges to e12
and the system exhibits coexistence.
c) When one strategy is selfish and the other altruistic, say ai > 0 > aj , then the selfish strategy,
i, wins in the sense that u1 converges to ei.
In terms of evolutionarily stable strategies, strategy i is an ESS if and only if strategy i is selfish.
The replicator equation described above is also the mean-field model associated with the spatial
game studied in Lanchier 2015 and summarized in appendix A, where payoffs affect birth and death
rates. This connection can be made rigorous by considering an interacting particle system where
the graph of interactions is the complete graph and time and space are properly rescaled. It is
of particular interest that the mean-field models corresponding to each of the interacting particle
systems analyzed in chapters 3-4 and appendix A have the same long-therm behavior as the replicator
equation analyzed above, yet the behavior of these three models are all different when interactions
are local. In nature, the assumption of a well-mixed population is not always realistic, so one needs




2.1 The Framework of Interacting Particle Systems
In order to include space and stochasticity in models of evolutionary games, we now describe
the framework of interacting particle systems. An interacting particle system is a continuous-time
Markov process ξt on a configuration space X := FV , where V is a countable set of particles and F is
a compact metric space, which serves as the state space for each individual vertex v ∈ V . Throughout
this document, we will take V = Zd and F = {1, 2}. Thus,
ξ : (R+,Zd) −→ {1, 2}
with
ξt(x) := ξ(t, x) = the state of vertex x ∈ Zd at time t ∈ R+.
Additionally, the state of any particle at a particular time depends only on its neighbors at an
infinitesimally prior time, where the neighbors are determined by a prescribed graph and interaction
(or dispersal) range. Interacting particle systems may be thought of as a more general framework in
which Markov chains lie by considering the interacting particle system as a collection of Markovian
particles whose fates are intertwined (and made non-markovian) by random interactions with one
another. Another view of interacting particle systems is as a continuous-time and stochastic version
of cellular automata.
The study of interacting particle systems began in the 1960s and early 1970s with the separate
works of Harris (Harris 1965), Spitzer (Spitzer 1969; Spitzer 1970), Dobrushin (Dobrushin 1965;
Dobrushin 1968), and Holley (Holley 1970), each constructing and studying a particular interacting
particle system under various assumptions. Particular existence theorems were proved by each, and in
Liggett 1972, Liggett proved existence for a general class of interacting particle systems. Interacting
particle systems has been one of the most vibrant areas of probability theory since then. For a great
introduction to and survey of early results in interacting particle systems, the reader is directed to
Liggett 1985.
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Models in the framework of interacting particle systems are not difficult to simulate, and these
simulations can be very informative, but they can also be difficult to interpret and lead to erroneous
conclusions. It is imperative, then, that analytic techniques be developed for studying these models.
This is supported in several places, including Evilsizor and Lanchier 2014, where it is shown that on
a d-dimensional lattice the dynamics of evolutionary games with the best-response update process
contrast significantly with the dynamics suggested by simulation, which can only be conducted on
finite graphs. Specifically, for an important parameter region, simulation suggests an end behavior of
stationary coexistence, whereas we proved that in this region there is no coexistence and the more
selfish strategy will take over at every location.
Some of the standard techniques in studying interacting particle systems include coupling
arguments, duality techniques, and comparison to percolation models, but the study of interacting
particle systems is rarely routine application of standard techniques.
2.2 Evolutionary Games as Interacting Particle Systems
The framework of interacting particle systems as applied to an individual-based evolutionary
game model includes: an update rule for determining which individuals in a population are modified
at any given time; an interaction structure, which determines which individuals can interact to
influence these modifications; and a game description, which describes the payoff or fitness given to
an individual by an interaction with others. In nature, interactions between individuals occur in a
stochastic and spatially-dependent manner. The framework of interacting particle systems is suitable
to explicitly incorporate these important factors. We focus on two-strategy, symmetric games played
by individuals on a d-dimensional integer lattice.
In terms of interacting particle systems, we describe this process by a continuous-time Markov
chain whose state at time t is a spatial configuration
ξt : Zd −→ {1, 2},
In words, each site on the integer lattice Zd is occupied by exactly one player who is characterized by
her strategy. For this reason, we use the terms ’site,’ ’vertex,’ ’player,’ and ’individual’ interchangeably
to describe x ∈ Zd or the player at site x. The strategy at time t ∈ [0,∞) of the player occupying
site x ∈ Zd is given by ξt(x). For a fixed interaction range M , we define the neighborhood of a site
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x ∈ Zd as
Nx :=
{
y ∈ Zd | 0 < d(x, y) ≤M} ,
where d(x, y) is a prescribed metric on Zd (typically either the Manhattan distance or Chebyshev
distance). The model’s spatial structure is included in the form of local interactions according to Nx
by assuming that each player’s payoff only depends on the strategy of individuals in her neighborhood.
More precisely, we define the 2× 2 payoff matrix A = (aij) where aij is interpreted as the payoff of a
player holding strategy i interacting with a player holding strategy j. Then the payoff to a player x
given the spatial configuration ξt is defined as
φ(x, ξt) := ai1N1(x, ξt) + ai2N2(x, ξt),
where i = ξt(x) and Nj(x, ξ) is the number of type j neighbors of vertex x, i.e.,
Nj(x, ξ) := card {y ∈ Nx | ξ(y) = j}.
In this way, the payoff matrix A together with the interaction neighborhood induce a payoff landscape
for each configuration ξt. The strategy at each vertex is updated according to a given update rule,
of which there are many choices. The update rule describes the rate at which a vertex updates its
strategy and the way in which the strategy is updated. These choices depend in a prescribed way on
the payoff landscape. In the following chapters, several different update rules will be considered.
2.2.1 Previous Work
A few others have studied evolutionary games using the framework of interacting particle systems.
In Nowak and May 1992 and Nowak and May 1993, evolutionary games were analyzed as cellular
automata. Subsequently Nowak, Bonhoeffer, and May 1994a and Nowak, Bonhoeffer, and May
1994b used simulations to explore the ways in which incorporation of continuous time and stochastic
update rules affect the dynamics. Using continuous time and stochastic update rules is essentially
a migration from cellular automata to interacting particle systems. In these articles, the authors
focused primarily on the prisoner’s dilemma and showed by simulation that local interactions can
promote the coexistence of strategies in situations where cooperators would be eliminated by defectors
if interactions were homogeneous. Langer, Nowak, and Hauert 2008 examines the prisoner’s dilemma
as interacting particle systems where the underlying graph is a finite square lattice in two dimensions,
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and the update rule is similar to that of the popular voter model (introduced in Holley and Liggett
1975 and Clifford and Sudbury 1973 as a model for spatial conflict), except that it deterministically
excludes transitions to less-fit states and preferentially chooses the state of more successful neighbors.
Fu, Nowak, and Hauert 2010 used the same interaction structure and update process as in the work
of Langer et al. to compare spatial invasion in the prisoner’s dilemma to that in the snowdrift game.
In both games, simulations suggest that coexistence occurs when conditions are sufficiently favorable
to cooperators, but there is a phase transition after which cooperators go extinct. By comparison
with the replicator dynamics, these results suggest that spatial structure may inhibit or eliminate
cooperation in the snowdrift game, but promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma. In both
games, cooperators survive by clustering together, but the form of the clusters are qualitatively
different between the two games.
The results given in the references above are mostly observations based on simulations. But
interacting particle systems is a rigorous mathematical framework, and we need not rely on simulations
alone. A few authors have carried out a rigorous analysis of evolutionary games using interacting
particle systems. Some of that work is described next, and continuing that work is the focus of this
thesis. Perhaps the first rigorous analysis of interacting particle models in evolutionary game theory
are the works of Chen 2013 and Cox, Durrett, and Perkins 2013 verifying the benefit-to-cost ratio
rule that was claimed by Ohtsuki et al. 2006 using compelling, though non-rigorous, arguments. The
models considered by these authors used so-called weak selection, in which
fitness = (1− w) + w × payoff and w → 0,
and relied on voter model perturbation techniques. The work of Durrett 2014 continues this analysis
in a broader setting, using that in the case of weak selection, as w → 0, the dynamics of the
process approach that of reaction-diffusion equations, and the analysis again relies on voter model
perturbations. In contrast, the perspective taken throughout this thesis uses strong selection, where
w = 1 so that fitness = payoff, and the techniques involved vary widely according to the model and
game (or parameter region) under consideration.
2.2.2 Three Spatial Evolutionary Game Models
In the present work, we consider three different models of evolutionary games. All three are
models of stochastic, spatial evolutionary games on a d-dimensional integer lattice. The differences
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between the three models is in their update rule, and they are named accordingly. The three models
are as described below:
1. Payoffs affecting birth and death rates: Players either die or give birth depending on the sign
of their payoff, and at an exponential rate equal to the magnitude of their payoff. If the player
dies, she is replaced by a neighbor chosen uniformly at random, and if the player gives birth,
her offspring replaces a neighbor chosen uniformly at random.
2. Best response dynamics: Individuals are assumed to be rational. Each individual has the
opportunity to update her strategy at rate one, and she changes her strategy if and only if it
increases her payoff to do so.
3. Death-birth process: Individuals die at rate one and are replaced by a neighbor chosen at
random with probability proportional to their payoff.
In this thesis, the dynamics of these three models are compared and contrasted with one another
and with the replicator equation to illustrate the effect of space and stochasticity on evolutionary
dynamics.
2.3 Main Results
In order to properly compare the spatial game models with their nonspatial analog (the replicator
equation), we assume that each spatial game process starts from a spatially homogeneous distribution,
i.e. a product measure in which the density of each of the two strategies is constant across the lattice.
In order to state the following results, we must first define what we mean by several terms. For a
spatial game ηt(x):
• We say that strategy i survives if there exists an x ∈ Zd such that,
lim inf
t→∞ P (ηt(x) = i) > 0.
• We say that two strategies, i and j, coexist if
lim inf
t→∞ P (ηt(x) = i, ηt(y) = j) > 0 for all x, y ∈ Z
d, x 6= y.
• We say that strategy i wins if for each x ∈ Zd,
lim
t→∞P (ηt(x) = i) = 1.
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We also refer to a strategy i as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if a population consisting
only of strategy i players cannot be invaded by an alternative strategy, given that the alternative
strategy has a sufficiently small initial density. More precisely, strategy i is an ESS if there exists a
p > 0 sufficiently small that strategy i wins for the process ηt starting from the product measure
with P (η0(x) = i) = 1− p for each x ∈ Zd.
In the following description of the results, we always assume that the strategies are named strategy
1 and strategy 2 with the numbers always chosen such that a21 > a12. This simplifies our description
of the results without a loss of generality. We also use the terms selfish and altruistic as defined
above. For a meaningful comparison with the replicator dynamics, we always assume that the initial
state, η0, for the spatial game is a product measure with density p ∈ (0, 1) and P (η0(x) = 1) = p for
each x ∈ Zd. Phase portraits giving an overview of the results for each model are given in Figures
3 – 6. For the Death-Birth process and Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death rates, more details are
available for the 1-dimensional, nearest-neighbors case, so a phase portrait in this case is provided for
these two models in Figures 7 and 8. Just after the following description of the results, the results for
the death-birth process and best-response dynamics are proved. These results and proofs constitute
the main work of this thesis. The results shown here for the Best Response Dynamics also appear in
the author’s publication Evilsizor and Lanchier 2014. The results shown here for the Death-Birth
Process also appear in the work Evilsizor and Lanchier 2016. Both works were co-authored with
Nicolas Lanchier.
Dynamics of the spatial games when both strategies are selfish
In this section, we assume that both strategies are selfish: that is, a11 > a21 and a22 > a12. We
have shown that under replicator dynamics, the system is bistable. Strategy 1 wins if the initial
density of strategy 1 players is sufficiently high, and strategy 2 wins otherwise. We compare this
result with the dynamics of the three spatial game models mentioned above and show that in the
spatial games, this region of bistability is reduced or eliminated. In all three spatial game models, we
show that there are regions in the selfish-selfish parameter space for which strategy 2 wins regardless
of the initial density p, and other regions where strategy 1 wins regardless of the initial density p. In
particular, for Best Response Dynamics, we show that the bistability region is completely eliminated
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and the more selfish strategy wins regardless of the initial density. Here, we consider strategy i to be
“more selfish” if aii − aji > ajj − aij .
In terms of the most popular games, mentioned in section 1.2, we may partially summarize
these results by saying that under replicator dynamics, the stag hunt game is always bistable, while
including space and stochasticity encourages one or the other strategy to win regardless of the initial
density. In particular, for Best Response Dynamics, the whole population becomes stag-hunters for a
portion of the parameter region, while the whole population becomes hare-hunters for the remaining
portion of the parameter region.
Dynamics of the spatial games when both strategies are altruistic
In this section, we assume that both strategies are altruistic: that is, a11 < a21 and a22 < a12.
In the case of replicator dynamics, we have shown that the population reaches a stable equilibrium
with coexistence of the two strategies. Our results for the spatial games are of two forms. First, we
show that this region of coexistence is reduced for two of the three spatial games, but not for the
Best Response Dynamics. In particular, for the Death-Birth process and for Payoffs Affecting Birth
and Death Rates, we exhibit a parameter region where strategy 2 wins in these two models, but
where there was coexistence in the replicator dynamics and in Best Response Dynamics. This region
of coexistence can be even further reduced with Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death Rates, and we
show that for a particular parameter region, type 1 wins where there is coexistence in the replicator
dynamics and the best response dynamics.
The second sort of result we have in the case of two altruistic strategies is to show that while
the coexistence region is reduced in the Death-Birth process and Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death
Rates, it is not removed entirely. That is, we can still find parameter choices such that these spatial
games exhibit coexistence. For the Death-Birth process and payoffs affecting birth and death rates,
coexistence requires a large interaction range as well as a particular choice of parameters.
In terms of the most popular games, mentioned in section 1.2, we may partially summarize these
results by saying that under replicator dynamics and Best Response Dynamics, there is always
coexistence between strategies in the Battle of the Sexes, Leader, and Hawk Dove games. There is
also coexistence in the Death-Birth process and for Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death Rates, but only
for a reduced parameter space. In these two spatial game models, there are some parameterizations
16
of all three games in which strategy 2 wins. For Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death Rates, it is also
possible for strategy 1 (doves) to win in particular parameterizations of the Hawk-Dove game.
Dynamics of the spatial games when one strategy is selfish and the other is altruistic
Lastly, we describe the dynamics when one strategy is altruistic and the other is selfish. This is
the case for the deadlock game, the prisoner’s dilemma, and the harmony game. In all four models,
strategy 2 (the selfish strategy) wins for the deadlock game. Some disagreements between the models
arise in the prisoner’s dilemma game. For the replicator equation and Best Response Dynamics,
strategy 2 (the defectors) always win in the prisoner’s dilemma. The same is true for Payoffs Affecting
Birth and Death Rates if we restrict ourselves to the one-dimensional case with nearest neighbor
interactions (M = 1), and simulations suggest that this is the case for higher dimensions and longer
interaction ranges as well. This is not the case for the Death-Birth process. In the Death-Birth
process, we can show that in the one-dimensional, nearest neighbor case, the cooperators (strategy 1)
will actually win in the prisoner’s dilemma for a particular parameter region, and simulations suggest
that there will be coexistence for a third portion of the prisoner’s dilemma parameter region.
In the harmony game, the dynamics are again simple to describe for the replicator equation and
best response dynamics. In both cases, strategy 1 (the strategy of cooperation) wins. This is also
true of the Death-Birth process and Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death rates, but only in a particular
subset of the harmony game parameter region. Simulations suggest that defectors (strategy 2) can
win in the harmony game if a21 − a12 is sufficiently large in relation to a11.
An important note on the results
It is important to note that the dynamics of all four models differ from one another. The replicator
dynamics were most similar to the best response dynamics, while the Death-Birth Process and
Payoffs Affecting Birth and Death Rates were similar to one another and very different from the
previous two models. This indicates that both the interaction structure and the update rule is a
very influential characteristic of evolutionary game models. We observe that the inclusion of local
interactions may or may not affect dynamics in each particular game, and it is difficult to describe in
broad strokes the way that local interactions will change the dynamics. Namely, we observe that the
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inclusion of space favored the selfish strategy in some cases and favored the altruistic strategy in
others. It had a tendency to reduce coexistence and bistability for the most part, but it expanded






















(1 Wins if u1(0) > u∗,
2 Wins if u1(0) < u∗)



















































Figure 5: Phase portrait for the death birth process on Zd.
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Figure 6: Phase portrait for the payoffs affecting birth and death rates on Zd.
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Figure 7: Phase portrait for nearest-neighbor death birth process on Z.
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The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their
strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this chapter is to study a stochastic
spatial version of this game based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which players
are located on an infinite square lattice. The contents of this chapter have been previously published
as Evilsizor and Lanchier 2014. In the presence of two strategies, and calling a strategy selfish or
altruistic depending on a certain ordering of the coefficients of the underlying payoff matrix, a simple
analysis of the nonspatial mean-field approximation of the spatial model shows that a strategy is
evolutionarily stable if and only if it is selfish, making the system bistable when both strategies are
selfish. The spatial and nonspatial models agree when at least one strategy is altruistic. In contrast,
we prove that in the presence of two selfish strategies and in any spatial dimension, only the most
selfish strategy remains evolutionarily stable. The main ingredients of the proof are monotonicity
results and a coupling between the best-response dynamics properly rescaled in space with bootstrap
percolation to compare the infinite time limits of both systems.
The framework of evolutionary game theory, which describes the dynamics of populations of
individuals identified to players, has been initiated by theoretical biologist Maynard Smith and
first appeared in his work with Price (Maynard Smith and Price 1973). Each individual-player
is characterized by one of a finite number n of possible strategies and is attributed a payoff that
is calculated based on the strategy of the surrounding players and an n × n payoff matrix. The
most popular model of evolutionary game is probably the so-called replicator equation reviewed in
Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, a system of deterministic differential equations for the frequencies of
players holding a given strategy. This chapter is a sequel of the work in Lanchier 2015 continuing
the analytical study of evolutionary games based on the framework of interacting particle systems
which, in contrast with the replicator equation, also includes stochasticity and space in the form of
local interactions.
Model description – The version of the best-response dynamics we consider in this chapter is a
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continuous-time Markov chain whose state at time t is a spatial configuration
ηt : Zd −→ {1, 2} := the set of strategies.
In words, each point of the d-dimensional square lattice is occupied by exactly one player who is
characterized by her strategy. The spatial structure is included in the form of local interactions
assuming that each player’s payoff only depends on the strategy of her 2d neighbors. More precisely,
having a two by two payoff matrix A = (aij) where aij is interpreted as the payoff of a player holding
strategy i interacting with a player holding strategy j, each configuration is turned into a so-called
payoff landscape that attributes a payoff to each vertex as follows:
φ(x, ηt) := (a11N1(x, ηt) + a12N2(x, ηt)) 1{ηt(x) = 1}
+ (a21N1(x, ηt) + a22N2(x, ηt)) 1{ηt(x) = 2} for all x ∈ Zd
where Nj(x, ηt) is the number of type j neighbors of vertex x, i.e.,
Nj(x, ηt) := card {y ∈ Zd : y ∼ x and ηt(y) = j}
where the binary relationship ∼ indicates that two vertices are neighbors. In the traditional framework
of evolutionary game theory, each strategy is often interpreted as a trait and each payoff defined
through the payoff landscape as a fitness or reproductive success. In particular, evolutionary game
theory makes the implicit assumption that players are not rational decision-makers who can choose
their strategy and that the evolution of the system is driven by births and deaths. In contrast, the
best-response dynamics assumes that players are rational decision-makers changing their strategy
in order to maximize their payoff. Specifically, we assume that each player updates her strategy at
an exponential rate one choosing to change her strategy if and only if it increases her payoff. In
particular, in case of a tie, i.e., the player would not change her payoff by changing her strategy,
nothing happens. More precisely, letting
φ1(x, ηt) := a11N1(x, ηt) + a12N2(x, ηt) for all x ∈ Zd
φ2(x, ηt) := a21N1(x, ηt) + a22N2(x, ηt) for all x ∈ Zd
(3.1)
be the payoff that the player at x would receive if she followed strategy 1 and 2, respectively, the
best-response dynamics is formally described by the Markov generator
Lf(ηt) =
∑
x 1{φ1(x, ηt) > φ2(x, ηt)} [f(ηx,1t )− f(ηt)]
+
∑
x 1{φ1(x, ηt) < φ2(x, ηt)} [f(ηx,2t )− f(η)]
(3.2)
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where the configuration ηx,it is obtained from ηt by setting to i the strategy at x and leaving the
strategy at the other vertices unchanged. Note that, for any given vertex x, the difference between
the two alternative payoffs in (3.1) can be written as
φ1(x, ηt)− φ2(x, ηt) = (a11N1(x, ηt) + a12N2(x, ηt))− (a21N1(x, ηt) + a22N2(x, ηt))
= (a11 − a21)N1(x, ηt)− (a22 − a12)N2(x, ηt).
In particular, the dynamics only depends on a1 := a11 − a21 and a2 := a22 − a12 rather than all four
coefficients of the payoff matrix so the Markov generator (3.2) can be written as
Lf(ηt) =
∑
x 1{a1N1(x, ηt) > a2N2(x, ηt)} [f(ηx,1t )− f(ηt)]
+
∑
x 1{a1N1(x, ηt) < a2N2(x, ηt)} [f(ηx,2t )− f(ηt)].
(3.3)
Since the behavior of the system strongly depends on the sign of a1 and a2, it is convenient to use
the terminology introduced in Lanchier 2013, 2015 by declaring strategy i to be
• altruistic when ai < 0, meaning that a player with strategy i confers a lower payoff to a player
following the same strategy than to a player following the other strategy,
• selfish when ai > 0, meaning that a player with strategy i confers a higher payoff to a player
following the same strategy than to a player following the other strategy.
Mean-field approximation – To understand the role of space in the long-term behavior of the
best-response dynamics, the first step is to look at the deterministic nonspatial version, or mean-field
approximation, of the process (3.3). This mean-field model is obtained under the assumption that
the population is well-mixed, and more precisely by looking at the process on the complete graph
in which any two players are neighbors and then taking the limit as the number of vertices tends
to infinity. This results in a system of differential equations for the frequency of players holding
strategy i that we denote by ui. In the absence of a spatial structure, the payoff that a player would
receive if she followed strategy 1 and 2, respectively, is
φ1(u1, u2) = a11 u1 + a12 u2 and φ2(u1, u2) = a21 u1 + a22 u2
which can be viewed as the nonspatial analog of (3.1). Also, under the evolution rules of the
best-response dynamics, either each type 1 player or each type 2 player changes her strategy at
an exponential rate one depending on whether φ1 − φ2 is negative or positive, respectively. Then,
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rescaling time by the number of vertices and taking the limit as the number of vertices tends to
infinity gives the following differential equation for the frequency of type 1 players:
u′1(t) = u2 1{φ1(u1, u2) > φ2(u1, u2)} − u1 1{φ1(u1, u2) < φ2(u1, u2)}
= u2 1{a1 u1 > a2 u2} − u1 1{a1 u1 < a2 u2}
= u2 1{(a1 + a2)u1 > a2} − u1 1{(a1 + a2)u1 < a2}
(3.4)
where we used that u1 + u2 = 1. Letting u∗ := a2 (a1 + a2)−1, we have
u′1(t) = +u2 when (u1 > u∗ and a1 + a2 > 0) or (u1 < u∗ and a1 + a2 < 0)
u′1(t) = −u1 when (u1 > u∗ and a1 + a2 < 0) or (u1 < u∗ and a1 + a2 > 0)
which shows the following four possible regimes:
• when strategy 1 is selfish and strategy 2 altruistic, strategy 1 wins in the sense that starting
from any initial condition u1(t)→ 1 as t→∞.
• when strategy 1 is altruistic and strategy 2 selfish, strategy 2 wins in the sense that starting
from any initial condition u1(t)→ 0 as t→∞.
• when both strategies are altruistic, coexistence occurs in the sense that starting from any initial
condition u1(t)→ u∗ ∈ (0, 1) as t→∞.
• when both strategies are selfish, the system is bistable:
u1(t)→ 0 as t→∞ when u1(0) < u∗ ∈ (0, 1)
u1(t)→ 1 as t→∞ when u1(0) > u∗ ∈ (0, 1).
In terms of evolutionarily stable strategy, this indicates that, for well-mixed populations, a strategy
is evolutionarily stable if it is selfish but not if it is altruistic. Recall that an evolutionarily stable
strategy is defined as a strategy which, if adopted by a population, cannot be invaded by any
alternative strategy starting at an infinitesimally small frequency. We point out that the mean-field
model derived here is slightly different than the replicator equation described by section 1.3, but the
end behavior is the same and is summarized by Theorem 1.
Spatial stochastic model – We now return to the spatial model (3.3) looking at the four parameter
regions corresponding to the four possible regimes of the mean-field approximation. Assuming first
that strategy 1 is selfish and strategy 2 altruistic, we get
a1N1(x, ηt)− a2N2(x, ηt) = a1N1(x, ηt) + (−a2)(2d−N1(x, ηt)) > 0
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for all x ∈ Zd and all configuration ηt. This shows that each type 2 player changes her strategy at
an exponential rate one whereas each type 1 player sticks to her strategy, therefore strategy 1 wins,
just as in the mean-field model, in the sense that for any initial configuration
limt→∞ P (ηt(x) = 1) = 1 for all x ∈ Zd.
By symmetry, strategy 2 wins whenever strategy 1 is altruistic and strategy 2 selfish. Note in
particular that the “all 1” and “all 2” configurations are not necessarily absorbing states for the
process. This is due to the fact that, though the new strategy is chosen based on the strategy of the
neighbors, it is not chosen from the neighborhood.
Looking now at altruistic-altruistic interactions, whenever the player at x and all her neighbors
follow the same strategy,
a1N1(x, ηt)− a2N2(x, ηt) = + 2d a1 < 0 when ηt(x) = 1
a1N1(x, ηt)− a2N2(x, ηt) = − 2d a2 > 0 when ηt(x) = 2.
In either case, the player at x changes her strategy at an exponential rate one, indicating that, as in
the mean-field model, two altruistic strategies coexist in the sense that
limt→∞ P (ηt(x) = ηt(y)) < 1 for all x, y ∈ Zd, x 6= y.
We now study the process when both strategies are selfish, a case more challenging mathematically
and also more interesting as it shows some important disagreements between the spatial and nonspatial
models. To confront our results for the spatial model with the bistability displayed by its nonspatial
counterpart, we consider the process starting from the product measure with
P (η0(x) = 1) =: p for all x ∈ Zd
and compare the models when p = u1(0). The fact that the inclusion of space in the form of local
interactions strongly affects the long-term behavior of the system can be seen in a specific parameter
region using a standard coupling with the Richardson model (Richardson 1973). Indeed, let
c(x, ηt) := limh→0 P (ηt+h(x) 6= ηt(x) | ηt). (3.5)
Then, when a1 > (2d− 1) a2 > 0 and N1(x, ηt) ≥ 1, we have
c(x, ηt | ηt(x) = 1) = 1 {a1N1(x, ηt) < a2N2(x, ηt)} ≤ 1 {a1 < (2d− 1) a2} = 0
c(x, ηt | ηt(x) = 2) = 1 {a1N1(x, ηt) > a2N2(x, ηt)} ≥ 1 {a1 > (2d− 1) a2} = 1
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(a) a1 = 1.01 > a2 = 1 and p = 0.15 (b) a1 = 1.01 > a2 = 1 and p = 0.20
Figure 9: Best-response dynamics on a 300× 300 lattice with periodic boundary conditions starting
from a product measure with density p of type 1 players in black. In (a), the process hits an absorbing
state in which both types are present, whereas in (b), which shows a snapshot of the process at time
25, the system is converging to the all black configuration: strategy 1 wins.
almost surely. These two inequalities imply that the set of type 1 players dominates stochastically
the set of infected sites in the Richardson model pit with initial configuration
pi0(x) = 1 {η0(x) = 1 and η0(y) = 1 for some y ∼ x}
which, in turn, implies that strategy 1 wins whenever p > 0. This shows in particular the existence
of parameter regions in which, in contrast with the nonspatial model, only the most selfish strategy
is evolutionarily stable for the spatial model. Returning to general selfish-selfish interactions, the
numerical simulations of the two-dimensional process displayed in Figure 9 suggest that, when a1 is
slightly larger than a2 and the initial density p > 0 is small, the system fixates to a configuration in
which the set of type 1 players consists of a union of disjoint rectangles, indicating that strategy 1 is
unable to invade strategy 2. These simulations, however, are misleading due to the finiteness of the
graph, and it can be proved that, in any dimension, the most selfish strategy always wins even when
starting at a low density. More precisely, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 – Assume that a1 > a2 > 0 and p > 0. Then,
limt→∞ P (ηt(x) = 1) = 1 for all x ∈ Zd.
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In particular, while any selfish strategy is evolutionarily stable in the nonspatial model, only the most
selfish strategy is evolutionarily stable in the spatial model. The result in one dimension directly
follows from our coupling with the Richardson model since
(2d− 1) a2 = a2 when d = 1
while the general result relies on a combination of monotonicity results and coupling arguments to
compare the best-response dynamics with bootstrap percolation. More precisely, we first prove that,
in the presence of selfish-selfish interactions, the best-response dynamics is attractive, which allows
us to focus on the process starting from a certain reduced configuration that consists of a union of
hyperrectangles. The second ingredient is to show that, for the process starting from this reduced
configuration, the set of type 1 players is a pure growth process, just like the Richardson model.
This strong monotonicity result is then applied repeatedly to show that the best-response dynamics
properly rescaled in space dominates stochastically bootstrap percolation with parameter d. From
this domination and a result due to Schonmann Schonmann 1992, Theorem 3.1, we finally deduce
that, unlike what Figure 9 suggests, the most selfish strategy indeed invades the entire lattice.
3.2 Some Monotonicity Results
To avoid cumbersome notations, it is convenient to sometimes think of the state of the process as
a subset rather than a function by using the identification:
ηt ≡ {x ∈ Zd : ηt(x) = 1} ⊂ Zd.
One key ingredient is to think of the process as being constructed from a so-called Harris’ graphical
representation (Harris 1972) which, in the case of the best-response dynamics, reduces to a collection
of independent Poisson processes. More precisely,
• for each x ∈ Zd, we let (Nt(x) : t ≥ 0) be a rate one Poisson process and
• we denote by Tn(x) := inf {t : Nt(x) = n} its nth arrival time.
The configuration at time t := Tn(x) is obtained from ηt− := lims↑t ηs by
adding x when a1N1(x, ηt−) > a2N2(x, ηt−)
removing x when a1N1(x, ηt−) < a2N2(x, ηt−).
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An argument due to Harris (Harris 1972) implies that the best-response dynamics starting from any
initial configuration can indeed be constructed using this rule. The next lemma shows that, in the
presence of selfish-selfish interactions, the best-response dynamics is attractive.
Lemma 3 – The process with a1 > 0 and a2 > 0 is attractive:
P (x ∈ η¯t) ≤ P (x ∈ ηt) for all (x, t) ∈ Zd × R+ whenever η¯0 ⊂ η0.
Proof. Let η¯t ⊂ ηt. Since a1 > 0 and a2 > 0,
a1N1(x, η¯t) ≤ a1N1(x, ηt) and a2N2(x, η¯t) ≥ a2N2(x, ηt). (3.6)
Let c(x, ηt) be defined as in (3.5). Using (3.6), we obtain that, for all x ∈ η¯t,
c(x, η¯t) = 1 {a1N1(x, η¯t) < a2N2(x, η¯t)}
≥ 1 {a1N1(x, ηt) < a2N2(x, ηt)} = c(x, ηt).
(3.7)
Similarly, for all x /∈ ηt, we have
c(x, η¯t) = 1 {a1N1(x, η¯t) > a2N2(x, η¯t)}
≤ 1 {a1N1(x, ηt) > a2N2(x, ηt)} = c(x, ηt).
(3.8)
The inequalities (3.7)–(3.8) show that condition (B14) in Liggett Liggett 1999 are satisfied, which
proves that, in the presence of selfish-selfish interactions, the process is attractive. 
In addition to attractiveness, a key ingredient to prove our theorem is to replace the initial
configuration η0 with a specific reduced initial configuration η¯0. To define this new initial configuration,
we introduce the following collection of hypercubes:
Hz := 2z + {0, 1}d for all z ∈ Zd.
Then, given η0, we say that Hz is a type 1 hypercube whenever Hz ⊂ η0 and define
η¯0 := {x ∈ Zd : x ∈ Hz and Hz ⊂ η0 for some z ∈ Zd}
= the union of all type 1 hypercubes.
(3.9)
Note that η¯0 ⊂ η0 therefore, according to Lemma 3,
P (x ∈ η¯t) ≤ P (x ∈ ηt) for all (x, t) ∈ Zd × R+.
In particular, it suffices to prove the theorem for the modified process η¯t that we call from now on
the sparse best-response dynamics. The main reason for working with this process appears in the
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next lemma which states that, starting from any configuration that consists of a union of hypercubes,
the process can only increase. This somewhat strong result is due in part to the fact that, while the
time of the updates are random, the outcome at each update is deterministic.
Lemma 4 – Assume that a1 > a2 > 0. Then, P (η¯s ⊂ η¯t for all s < t) = 1.
Proof. Let Φ be the function defined on the set of configurations by
Φ(ηt) := {x ∈ Zd : a1N1(x, ηt) > a2N2(x, ηt)
or (x ∈ ηt and a1N1(x, ηt) = a2N2(x, ηt))}.
(3.10)
In words, while ηt represents the set of vertices following strategy 1, configuration Φ(ηt) can be seen
as the set of vertices that will become or stay of type 1 at the next update provided the configuration
in their neighborhood does not change by the time of the update. Note that, due to the presence of
selfish-selfish interactions: a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, we have
ηt ⊂ η′t implies that N1(x, ηt) ≤ N1(x, η′t) and N2(x, ηt) ≥ N2(x, η′t)
implies that a1N1(x, ηt)− a2N2(x, ηt) ≤ a1N1(x, η′t)− a2N2(x, η′t)
implies that Φ(ηt) ⊂ Φ(η′t)
(3.11)
indicating that the function Φ is nondecreasing. In addition, for any configuration η¯0 obtained by
reduction of an arbitrary initial configuration using the partition into hypercubes, since each type 1
player has at least d type 1 neighbors and a1 > a2 > 0, we also have
x ∈ η¯0 implies that N1(x, η¯0) ≥ d and N2(x, η¯0) ≤ d
implies that a1N1(x, η¯0) > a2N2(x, η¯0)
implies that x ∈ Φ(η¯0)
(3.12)
indicating that η¯0 ⊂ Φ(η¯0).
Monotonicity (3.11) and the generalization of (3.12) to all times are the main two ingredients to
establish the lemma that we prove by induction. Since the lattice is infinite, the time of the first
update does not exist. Also, in order to prove the result inductively, the next step is to use an idea of
Harris Harris 1972 to break down the lattice into finite islands that do not interact with each other
for a short time. More precisely, we do the following construction:
• we let  > 0 be small and, for each vertex x such that T1(x) < , draw a line segment between x
and each of its 2d nearest neighbors.
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This construction naturally induces a partition of the lattice into clusters, where two vertices belong
to the same cluster if there is a sequence of line segments connecting them. In addition, since the
probability of two neighbors x ∼ y being connected by a line segment
P (there is a line segment between x and y)
= P (min(T1(x), T1(y)) < ) = 1− e−2
can be made arbitrarily small by choosing time  > 0 small, Theorem 1.33 in Grimmett 1989 implies
that there exists  > 0 small, fixed from now on, such that each cluster is almost surely finite.
Letting A be an arbitrary, necessarily finite, cluster, we have the following two properties:
(a) the configuration in A at time  only depends on the initial configuration of the process and its
graphical representation restricted to the cluster A.
(b) whenever (x ∈ A and Nx 6⊂ A) or (x ∈ Ac and Nx 6⊂ Ac) where Nx refers to the interaction
neighborhood of vertex x, the strategy at x is not updated before time .
Now, since A is finite, the number of updates in A up to time  is almost surely finite and therefore
can be ordered. Let the times of these updates and their corresponding locations be
s0 := 0 < s1 < s2 < · · · < sm <  and x1, x2, . . . , xm ∈ A.
By (a) and the definition of the function Φ, we have
x1 ∈ η¯s1 if and only if x1 ∈ Φ(η¯0).
But according to (3.12), we also have η¯0 ⊂ Φ(η¯0) therefore
(x1 ∈ η¯s0 implies x1 ∈ η¯s1) so (η¯s0 ∩A) ⊂ (η¯s1 ∩A) ⊂ (Φ(η¯s0) ∩A). (3.13)
This, together with (b) and the monotonicity of Φ in (3.11), implies
(Φ(η¯s0) ∩A) ⊂ (Φ(η¯s1) ∩A) and (η¯s1 ∩A) ⊂ (Φ(η¯s1) ∩A). (3.14)
The last inclusion in (3.14) allows us to repeat the same reasoning to get (3.13)–(3.14) at the next
update time, and so on up to time sm. Using in addition the obvious fact that the configuration
in the cluster A does not change between two consecutive updates implies that the property to be
proved holds at all times smaller than  so we have
(η¯s ∩A) ⊂ (η¯t ∩A) and (η¯t ∩A) ⊂ (Φ(η¯t) ∩A) for all s < t ≤ . (3.15)
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This only proves the result for the process restricted to A and up to time . To extend the result
across the lattice and for all times, we first use that the set of all the clusters forms a cover of the
lattice and union (3.15) over all the possible clusters:
η¯s =
⋃
A (η¯s ∩A) ⊂
⋃
A (η¯t ∩A) = η¯t for all s < t ≤ 
η¯ =
⋃
A (η¯ ∩A) ⊂
⋃
A (Φ(η¯) ∩A) = Φ(η¯).
(3.16)
This first inclusion proves the lemma up to time  while the second inclusion can be used, together
with the fact that the process is Markov, to restart the argument and extend the result inductively
up to time 2, then 3, and so on. This proves the result at all times. 
3.3 Coupling with Bootstrap Percolation
This section is devoted to the proof of the theorem, which relies on a coupling between bootstrap
percolation and the best-response dynamics. Bootstrap percolation with parameter m is the discrete-
time process whose state at time t is a spatial configuration
ψt : Zd −→ {0, 1} where 0 = empty and 1 = occupied
that evolves deterministically as follows: for all z ∈ Zd and t ∈ N,
ψt(z) = 1 implies that ψt+1(z) = 1
ψt(z) = 0 implies that ψt+1(z) = 1 if and only if card {w ∼ z : ψt(w) = 1} ≥ m.
We will couple the best response dynamics with a modified bootstrap percolation model, ξt, which
we call the modified basic bootstrap percolation model as named in Schonmann 1992. ξt evolves
identically to ψt except that m is taken to be always equal to d, the dimension of the lattice, and
ξt(z) = 0 implies that ξt+1(z) = 1 if and only if 1 ∈ {ξt(z + ei), ξt(z − ei)} for each i = 1, . . . , d.
In words, that is, a 0 becomes a 1 if in each one of the d coordinate directions, it has at least one
neighbor which is a 1.
In view of Lemma 4 for the sparse best-response dynamics and the evolution rules of bootstrap
percolation, both processes are almost surely monotone, therefore the limits
η¯∞ := limt→∞ η¯t and ξ∞ := limt→∞ ξt exist.
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Here, we again identify configurations with the set of vertices in state 1. From now on, we call the
two limit sets above, the infinite time limits of the sparse best-response dynamics and bootstrap
percolation, respectively. To prove the theorem, we first rely on the monotonicity results of the
previous section to show that the infinite time limit of the sparse best-response dynamics properly
rescaled in space dominates its counterpart for bootstrap percolation. The main ingredient is to
couple both systems using the key function introduced in (3.10). Based on this coupling, we can
directly deduce the theorem from its analog for modified basic bootstrap percolation on the infinite
lattice starting from a product measure, a result due to Schonmann (Schonmann 1992, Theorem 3.1).
Lemma 5 – Assume that a1 > a2 > 0. Then,
Φn(η¯s) := (Φ ◦ Φ ◦ · · · ◦ Φ)(η¯s) ⊂ η¯∞ almost surely for all s > 0 and n ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove the result by induction with respect to n.
Base case – This follows from Lemma 4 which gives
P (Φ0(η¯s) ⊂ η¯∞) = P (η¯s ⊂ η¯∞) ≥ P (η¯s ⊂ η¯t for all s < t) = 1.
Inductive step – Assume Φn(η¯s) ⊂ η¯∞ and x ∈ Φn+1(η¯s) \ Φn(η¯s). Then,
Ty := inf {T > 0 : y ∈ η¯T } <∞ a.s. for all y ∈ Φn(η¯s) and
τx := max {Ty : y ∼ x and y ∈ Φn(η¯s)} <∞ a.s.
(3.17)
In addition, the choice of x implies that
a1N1(x,Φ
n(η¯s)) > a2N2(x,Φ
n(η¯s)) since x ∈ Φ (Φn(η¯s)) \ Φn(η¯s) (3.18)
while a new application of Lemma 4 gives
N1(x, η¯t) ≥ N1(x,Φn(η¯s)) and N2(x, η¯t) ≤ N2(x,Φn(η¯s)) (3.19)
for all t > τx. Combining (3.18)–(3.19) and using that a1 > 0 and a2 > 0, we get
a1N1(x, η¯t) ≥ a1N1(x,Φn(η¯s))
> a2N2(x,Φ
n(η¯s)) ≥ a2N2(x, η¯t) for all t > τx.
It follows that, given that the player at vertex x follows strategy 2 after time τx, she switches to
strategy 1 at rate one. This together with (3.17) implies that
Tx = inf {t > 0 : x ∈ η¯t} <∞ a.s. therefore x ∈ η¯∞. (3.20)
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Finally, using consecutively (3.11) and (3.16) and then (3.20), we deduce that
Φn(η¯s) ⊂ Φ (Φn(η¯s)) = Φn+1(η¯s)
and Φn+1(η¯s) = (Φn+1(η¯s) \ Φn(η¯s)) ∪ Φn(η¯s) ⊂ η¯∞
which shows the result at step n+ 1 and completes the proof. 
We are now ready to prove that the infinite time limit of the best-response dynamics properly
rescaled in space dominates the infinite time limit of bootstrap percolation. More precisely, we look
at the best-response dynamics viewed at the hypercube level by introducing
ζt : Zd −→ {0, 1} where ζt(z) := 1{Hz ⊂ η¯t} for all z ∈ Zd. (3.21)
From now on, we call this process the hypercubic best-response dynamics. Identifying once more
configurations with the set of vertices in state 1 and using again the monotonicity of the sparse
best-response dynamics given by Lemma 4, we note that
ζ∞ := limt→∞ ζt = limt→∞ {z : Hz ⊂ η¯t}
= {z : Hz ⊂ limt→∞ η¯t} = {z : Hz ⊂ η¯∞}
(3.22)
therefore the infinite time limit ζ∞ is well-defined.
Lemma 6 – Assume that a1 > a2 > 0. Then,
ξ∞ ⊂ ζ∞ almost surely whenever ξ0 = ζ0.
Proof. Let z ∈ Zd and s > 0, and assume that
ζs(z) = 0 and 1 ∈ {ζs(z + ei), ζs(z − ei)} for each i = 1, . . . , d. (3.23)
Recalling (3.21), this indicates that there are at least d hypercubes adjacent to Hz that are completely
occupied by players of type 1. Invoking the invariance by symmetry of the best-response dynamics,
we may assume without loss of generality that
Hz−ej ⊂ η¯s for j = 1, 2, . . . , d where ej := jth unit vector. (3.24)
Since a1 > a2 > 0, we also have
Φ(η¯s) ⊃ {x ∈ Zd : N1(x, η¯s) ≥ N2(x, η¯s)} = {x ∈ Zd : N1(x, η¯s) ≥ d}. (3.25)
Combining (3.24)–(3.25) together with Lemma 4 and some basic geometry, we get
2z + {x ∈ {0, 1}d : ∑j=1,2,...,d xj < n} ⊂ Φn(η¯s) for n = 1, 2, . . . , d+ 1. (3.26)
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Figure 10: Picture of the progression η¯s → Φ(η¯s) → Φ2(η¯s) → Φ3(η¯s) starting from the union of
three hypercubes adjacent to the same hypercube. The figure gives an illustration of the inclusions
in (3.26).
For an illustration in three dimensions, we refer to Figure 10 where configuration η¯s consists of the
union of three hypercubes. In particular, taking n = d+ 1 gives
Hz = 2z + {x ∈ {0, 1}d :
∑
j=1,2,...,d xj ≤ d} ⊂ Φd+1(η¯s).
Applying Lemma 5, we then obtain
Hz ⊂ Φd+1(η¯s) ⊂ η¯∞ therefore ζt(z) = 1 for some time t <∞ a.s. (3.27)
in view of (3.22). In addition, since the hypercubic process clearly inherits the monotonicity property
of the sparse best-response dynamics given by Lemma 4,
ζs(z) = 1 implies that P (ζt(z) = 1 for all t > s) = 1. (3.28)
In summary, (3.28) and the fact that (3.23) implies (3.27) indicate that: for the hypercubic process,
once a vertex is occupied it remains occupied forever, and if an empty vertex has at least one occupied
neighbor in each of the d coordinate directions then it becomes occupied after an almost surely finite
time. Recalling the evolution rules of modified basic bootstrap percolation, the result follows. 
Combining the previous lemma with a result of Schonmann 1992, Theorem 3.1 on bootstrap
percolation on the infinite lattice, we now deduce Theorem 2:
limt→∞ P (ηt(x) = 1) = 1 for all x ∈ Zd when a1 > a2 > 0 and p > 0.
Proof. To begin with, we consider the modified basic bootstrap percolation model starting from the
product measure with density q. That is, the initial configuration satisfies
P (ξ0(z1) = ξ0(z2) = · · · = ξ0(zn) = 1) = qn for z1, z2, . . . , zn ∈ Zd all distinct.
Whether the set of occupied vertices ultimately covers the entire lattice depends on the initial
density, and the fact that bootstrap percolation is clearly attractive motivates the introduction of
35
the following critical value for the initial density:
qc := inf {q ∈ [0, 1] : P (ξ∞ = Zd) = 1}.
Schonmann 1992, Theorem 3.1 proved that qc = 0, therefore
P (ξ∞ = Zd) = 1 whenever m = d and q > 0.
In particular, taking q := p2
d
so that
P (ζ0(z) = 1) = P (η¯0(x) = 1 for all x ∈ Hz) = p2d = q = P (ξ0(z) = 1),
assuming that p > 0 and applying Lemmas 3 and 6, we get
limt→∞ P (ηt(x) = 1) ≥ limt→∞ P (η¯t(x) = 1) = P (x ∈ η¯∞)
≥ P (η¯∞ = Zd) = P (ζ∞ = Zd) ≥ P (ξ∞ = Zd) = 1





This chapter is concerned with the death-birth updating process, and includes the work that has
been previously published as Evilsizor and Lanchier 2016. This model is an example of a spatial
game in which players located on the d-dimensional integer lattice are characterized by one of two
possible strategies and update their strategy at rate one by mimicking one of their neighbors chosen
at random with a probability proportional to the neighbor’s payoff. The model studied here is closely
related to a version of the death-birth updating process in evolutionary game theory introduced
in Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006. The model in Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006 assumes that the updates are
neutral with high probability and based on the payoff of the neighbors with small probability, which
we refer respectively as voter and game steps. In contrast, the model considered in this chapter only
accounts for game steps, so the duality techniques Cox, Durrett, and Perkins 2013 developed for
voter model perturbations are no longer available tools to study the process. Instead, our analysis is
based on comparisons with oriented site percolation, coupling arguments, and martingale techniques.
The main objective is to study the limiting behavior of the spatial stochastic process and confront
our results with the limiting behavior of the replicator equation in order to understand the effects of
the inclusion of space.
Model description – The process studied in this chapter, which we again refer to as the death-
birth updating process following the terminology in Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006, is a spin system on
the d-dimensional integer lattice where each vertex is occupied by a player characterized by one of
two possible strategies, say strategy 1 and strategy 2. The state at time t is a function
ξt : Zd → {1, 2} where ξt(x) = strategy at vertex x at time t.
The dynamics of this process or any other spatial game is defined in a couple of steps: we first fix
a payoff matrix, which allows us to turn every spatial configuration of strategies into a so-called
payoff landscape, which can then be used to define the transition rates at each vertex. Since we focus
on games with two strategies, the payoff matrix is a 2× 2 matrix A = (aij) whose coefficients are
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positive real numbers interpreted as
aij = payoff of a type i player interacting with a type j player.
In nonspatial evolutionary games, players interact equally with any other player in the population,
making their payoff a function of the global frequency of representatives of each strategy. In contrast,
spatial games assume that the payoff of a player depends exclusively on the strategy of a finite set of
neighbors, which is the key to designing more realistic models with local interactions. Throughout
this chapter, the interaction neighborhood of vertex x is the set
Nx := {y ∈ Zd : y 6= x and maxj=1,2,...,d |xj − yj | ≤M}
where the constant M is called the range of the interactions. Letting Nj(x, ξ) be the number of
neighbors of the player at vertex x following strategy j, every spatial configuration ξ is then turned
into a payoff landscape by attributing the payoff
φ(x, ξ) :=
∑
j aij Nj(x, ξ)} where i = ξ(x), (4.1)
to the player at vertex x. In words, each type i player receives aij from each of her neighbors
following strategy j. The last step to define the dynamics of the process is to follow Maynard Smith
and Price 1973 and interpret the payoff as fitness. The basic idea here is to write the rate at which a
player changes her strategy as a function of her payoff and the payoff of her neighbors in such a way
that players with a larger payoff are more likely to spread their strategy. There are multiple options.
For instance, the updating rules considered in Evilsizor and Lanchier 2014; Lanchier 2015 are as
follows.
• Best-response dynamics Evilsizor and Lanchier 2014. Players update their strategy at rate one
in order to maximize their payoff, which depends on the strategy of their neighbors.
• Payoff affecting birth and death rates Lanchier 2015. In this process, when a player has a
positive payoff, at rate this payoff, one of her neighbors chosen at random adopts her strategy,
whereas when her payoff is negative, at rate minus this payoff, she adopts the strategy of one of
her neighbors chosen at random. This updating rule is inspired from Brown and Hansell 1987.
The dynamics of the death-birth updating process is built using a similar approach: we assume that
players update their strategy at rate one by mimicking a random neighbor, with each neighbor being
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chosen with a probability proportional to her payoff. More precisely, letting ξ be the configuration of
the system, the player at x switches her strategy i→ j at rate
pi→j(x, ξ) :=
∑
y∈Nx φ(y, ξ) 1{ξ(y) = j}∑
y∈Nx φ(y, ξ)
for {i, j} = {1, 2}. (4.2)
Note that, when all four payoff coefficients are equal, the expression above is equal to the fraction of
type j neighbors, thus showing that, in this particular case, the death-birth updating process reduces
to the voter model introduced independently in Clifford and Sudbury 1973 and Holley and Liggett
1975.
The model described by the two transition rates in 4.2, or to be more specific, a closely related
version of this model, has been introduced and studied heuristically in Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006
while Chen 2013; Cox, Durrett, and Perkins 2013 give rigorous results. The process considered in
these works can be seen as the weak selection approximation of the model described by (4.2). Players
again update their strategy at rate one but, at the time of the update,
• with probability 1− , the player mimics the strategy of a neighbor chosen uniformly at random,
just like in the voter model Clifford and Sudbury 1973; Holley and Liggett 1975, while
• with probability , the player mimics a neighbor chosen at random according to probabilities
that are proportional to the neighbors’ payoff, as described by (4.2).
This model is studied in Chen 2013; Cox, Durrett, and Perkins 2013; Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006
when  is small, in which case duality techniques for voter model perturbations are available. For
a general definition of duality for interacting particle systems, we refer the reader to Liggett 1985,
section II.3. In contrast, we study the process when  = 1, in which case duality cannot be used,
which leads to more qualitative and less quantitative results.
The replicator equation – Before studying the spatial game, it is worth taking a quick look at
its nonspatial deterministic analog to later identify disagreements between both models and thus
understand the effect of the inclusion of space in the form of local interactions. The nonspatial model
is obtained by assuming that the population of players is well-mixed, which results in a system of
ordinary differential equations for the frequency of each strategy. In the case of the death-birth
process, this is a time-change of the replicator equation:
u′1 = u1 u2 (φ1(u1, u2)− φ2(u1, u2)) (4.3)
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where uj is the frequency of players following strategy j and
φ1(u1, u2) = a11u1 + a12u2 and φ2(u1, u2) = a21u1 + a22u2
are the common payoffs of all type 1 and all type 2 players, respectively. This can be viewed as
the nonspatial analog of the payoff landscape (4.1). Since each player follows either strategy 1 or
strategy 2, we always have u1 + u2 = 1, which implies that, in the presence of two strategies, the
replicator equation is only one-dimensional and easy to analyze. As pointed out in Lanchier 2013,
the limiting behavior can be conveniently described by introducing the parameters
a1 := a11 − a21 and a2 := a22 − a12
and calling strategy i selfish whenever ai > 0 and altruistic whenever ai < 0. Then, following the
usual terminology by calling a strategy an evolutionarily stable strategy if it cannot be invaded by
any alternative strategy starting at an infinitesimally small frequency, some basic algebra shows that
the behavior of the replicator equation (4.3) is as follows:
• when a1 a2 < 0, the selfish strategy always outcompetes the altruistic strategy, showing that
the selfish strategy is the only evolutionarily stable strategy,
• when a1, a2 > 0, there is an unstable interior fixed point so the system is bistable, showing
that the two (selfish) strategies are evolutionarily stable,
• when a1, a2 < 0, there is a globally stable interior fixed point so both strategies coexist and
none of the two (altruistic) strategies is evolutionarily stable.
In summary, the analysis of the replicator equation shows that, when the population is well-mixed, a
strategy is an evolutionarily stable strategy if it is selfish but not if it is altruistic.
Main results for the spatial game – In order to compare the spatial game with its nonspatial
analog, we assume that the process starts from a translation invariant product measure in which the
density of each of the two strategies is constant across the lattice. Since the two configurations in
which all players follow the same strategy are absorbing states, we also assume, to avoid trivialities,
that the density of each strategy is positive. From now on, we assume without loss of generality
that a21 > a12 > 0 and study the limiting behavior of the process as the other two payoffs vary.
To begin with, we look at the parameter region where both strategies are altruistic. In this case,
coexistence occurs when the population is well-mixed, i.e., when the dynamics is described by the
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replicator equation 4.3. Numerical simulations suggest that, except in the one-dimensional nearest
neighbor case, coexistence is again possible for the spatial game though the coexistence region is
reduced. The smaller the spatial dimension and/or the range of the interactions, the smaller the
coexistence region. Our first two theorems show that coexistence is indeed possible and that the
coexistence region for the spatial game is indeed reduced. More precisely, Theorem 7 shows that,
regardless of the spatial dimension, both strategies coexist when they are sufficiently altruistic and
the range of the interactions is sufficiently large.
Theorem 7 – Let a21 > a12 > 0. Then, there exist a > 0 and M0 <∞, which depends on a, such
that the death-birth updating process coexists when
max (a11, a22) ≤ a and M > M0.
To prove that the coexistence region is reduced, and more generally identify parameter regions
in which one strategy wins, we first observe that, when a11 = a12 and a22 = a21, the process is
significantly simplified because the payoff of the players only depends on their strategy but not on
the strategy of their neighbors. Indeed, in this case (4.1) reduces to
φ(x, ξ) =
∑
j aij Nj(x, ξ)1{ξ(x) = i} = aii ((2M + 1)d − 1)1{ξ(x) = i}
for i = 1, 2, therefore the transition rates become
pi→j(x, ξ) =
∑




aiiNi(x, ξ) + ajj Nj(x, ξ)
for {i, j} = {1, 2}. It follows that, under our general assumption a12 < a21, the set of type 2
players dominates stochastically a certain biased voter model Bramson and Griffeath 1980, 1981,
thus showing that, in this very special case, strategy 2 wins. Elaborating on this idea but using
coupling arguments to compare the death-birth updating process with spin systems which are more
complicated than the biased voter model, we can prove much more, as shown in the next theorem.
Theorem 8 – Let a21 > a12 and let N := cardNx = (2M + 1)d − 1. Then,
(a) strategy 1 wins when min (a12 − a22, a11 − a21) > (N − 1)(a21 − a12),
(b) strategy 2 wins when (M,d) 6= (1, 1) and
(N2 −N − 1) max (a11 − a21, a12 − a22, a11 − a22) < a21 − a12.
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Figure 11 shows the parameter regions in both parts of the theorem. Note that the parameter
region in the first part of the theorem is nonempty if and only if
a12 − (N − 1)(a21 − a12) > 0 if and only if a12 > (1− 1/N) a21.
The figure shows this region for N = 2, i.e., in the presence of one-dimensional nearest neighbor
interactions. In contrast, the parameter region in the second part of the theorem is always nonempty
and, more interestingly, it always overlaps the region where both strategies are altruistic as well as
the region where both strategies are selfish. This shows that the inclusion of a spatial structure in
the form of local interactions indeed reduces the coexistence region, as mentioned above. This also
shows that, in a subset of the parameter region where the replicator equation is bistable, there is
instead a strong type for the spatial game that wins even starting at low density. The next theorem
goes a little bit further in this direction by showing that, no matter how selfish a strategy is, the
other strategy always wins if it is selfish enough.
Theorem 9 – For all a > 0 there is A <∞ such that strategy 1 wins when
max (a21, a22) ≤ a and a11 > A.
This theorem extends the parameter region where strategy 1 wins found in Theorem 8. In
addition, contrary to Theorem 8, this theorem does not assume that a12 < a21. Therefore, its dual
statement obtained by exchanging the role of both strategies holds as well, showing that Theorem 9
also extends the parameter region where strategy 2 wins found in Theorem 8. We state this explicitly
in the following remark:
Remark 10 – For all a > 0 there is A <∞ such that strategy 2 wins when
max (a12, a11) ≤ a and a22 > A.
The results collected so far indicate interesting discrepancies between the death-birth updating
process and the replicator equation, showing the importance of local interactions. The most
interesting aspect suggested by spatial simulations is the existence of a subset of the parameter region
corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma game in which cooperators win on the lattice whereas they


























1 altruistic 1 selfish
TH 8(a)
Figure 11: Phase diagram of the spatial game along with a summary of the theorems in the a11 − a22
plane. In the picture, the points p− and p+ are the two points introduced in the proof of Lemma 18.
is characterized by the following ordering and terminology of the four payoffs:
a12 = sucker’s payoff < a22 = punishment < a11 = reward < a21 = temptation.
Figure 12 shows the corresponding triangular region in solid lines. Players with strategy 1 are
called cooperators while players with strategy 2 are called defectors. Because the reward is not as
good as the temptation, and the punishment is not as bad as the sucker’s payoff, cooperators are
altruistic and defectors selfish, therefore defectors indeed win when the population is well-mixed.
In contrast, the heuristic arguments in Ohtsuki and Nowak 2006 suggest that there is a subset of
the prisoner’s dilemma triangle in which cooperators are favored over defectors on regular graphs.
This has been proved in Chen 2013 for finite, connected, simple graphs, and in Cox, Durrett, and
Perkins 2013 for integer lattices with d > 2. Their results, however, hold in the weak selection case
but not for the process (4.2). We now study the interactions among cooperators and defectors in one






















a11 = a21a11 = a12
a22 = a21
a22 = a12
Figure 12: Phase diagram of the one-dimensional nearest neighbor spatial game when a21/a12 = 2.
The lower thick curve is obtained from the conditions in Theorem 11 and the upper thick curve by
exchanging the role of strategies 1 and 2 in Theorem 11. In particular, strategy 1 wins below the
lower curve while strategy 2 wins above the upper curve. The triangle in solid lines represents the
parameter region corresponding to the prisoner’s dilemma game.
To state our last result, we introduce the following quantities that will be interpreted later as
drift of a certain interface:
D3 :=
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + a21 + a22
− a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
D4 :=
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + 2a22
− a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
.
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 11 – Assume M = d = 1. Then, strategy 1 wins when
(a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0) or (a22 > a21 and D4 > 0).
Note that the parameter region given by the theorem overlaps but is not restricted to the prisoner’s
dilemma triangle. To see that the theorem implies the existence of a subset of the triangle in which
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In particular, the first parameter region given by the theorem in which cooperators win indeed overlap
the prisoner’s dilemma triangle. The theorem also implies that strategy 2 wins in the parameter
regions obtained by exchanging the role of the two strategies, i.e. letting
D¯3 :=
a22 + a21
a22 + a21 + a12 + a11
− a12 + a11
2a22 + a12 + a11
D¯4 :=
a22 + a21
a22 + a21 + 2a11
− a12 + a11
2a22 + a12 + a11
.
and again M = d = 1, strategy 2 wins when
(a11 < a12 and D¯3 + D¯4 > 0) or (a11 > a12 and D¯4 > 0). (4.4)
Finally, observing that D4 + D¯4 = 0, we deduce that
strategy 1 wins when a22 > a21 and D4 > 0
strategy 2 wins when a11 > a12 and D4 < 0
showing that, when min(a11, a22) > max(a12, a21), the condition is sharp. Figure 12 gives a picture
of the curves derived from the theorem when a21/a12 = 2.
4.2 Coexistence of Altruistic Strategies
This section is devoted to the proof of our coexistence result Theorem 7. To prove this result, we
think of the process as being generated from a graphical representation which, for the death-birth
updating process, reduces to a countable collection of independent Poisson processes and uniform
random variables. More precisely, for each (x, n) ∈ Zd × N∗, let
Tn(x) := the nth arrival time of a Poisson process with intensity one
Un(x) := uniform random variable on the interval (0, 1).
Then, at time s := Tn(x), the strategy at x is set equal to
1 when Un(x) < p2→1(x, ξs−)
2 when Un(x) > p2→1(x, ξs−)
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where pi→j(x, ξ) has been defined in (4.2). An argument due to Harris 1972 implies that the process
starting from any initial configuration can indeed be constructed following these rules.
In the proof of the coexistence result, we focus for simplicity on the two-dimensional case but our
approach easily extends to any spatial dimension. Specifically, we will prove that both strategies
coexist when M is large and
max (a11, a22) ≤ 5−2 2−21 (c−)5 min (a12, a21) = 2−14 (c+)−1 min (a12, a21) (4.5)
where the two key constants c− and c+ are defined as
c− := 2−17 min (a12/a21, a21/a12) and c+ := 52 27(c−)−5. (4.6)
Let s := ln(2) and Kr := [−rM, rM)2 for all r > 0, and fix
A,B ⊂ K1/2 with card(A) = card(B) = 2−2M2.
The proofs of Lemmas 13–14 below hold for such general sets though they will be applied ultimately
to more specific space-time boxes. One key to the proof is to observe that
maxj=1,2 |xj − yj | ≤M for all (x, y) ∈ A×B.
For all D ⊂ Z2 finite and i = 1, 2, we let
ζit(D) := card {x ∈ D : ξt(x) = i}
denote the number of type i players in the set D at time t. Throughout the proof, we will use
repeatedly the large deviation estimate
P (Binomial (K, p) ≤ K (p− z)) ≤ exp(−Kz2/2p) for all z ∈ (0, p) (4.7)
which follows from Arratia and Gordon 1989, Theorem 1 and the fact that, setting q = 1− p, we have
P (Binomial (K, p) ≤ K (p− z)) = P (Binomial (K, 1− p) ≥ K −K (p− z))
= P (Binomial (K, q) ≥ K (q + z)).
Keeping the players in a box – To begin with, we prove in the next lemma that, the number
of players of either type in a given spatial region does not decrease too fast. The idea is to simply
find a bound for the number of updates using standard large deviation estimates for the binomial
random variable. This lemma will be used repeatedly later.
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Lemma 12 – Let D ⊂ Z2 be finite and n ∈ N. Then, for i = 1, 2,
P (ζit(D) ≤ 2−(n+1)K for some t ∈ (0, ns) | ζi0(D) ≥ K) ≤ exp(−2−(n+3)K).
Proof. To begin with, we let
ui(D) := card {x ∈ D : ξ0(x) = i and T1(x) < ns}
denote the total number of players in the set D who are initially of type i and update their strategy
at least once by time ns. Here and after, updates refer to the death-birth events that occur at
the times Tn(x). In particular, an update does not necessarily induce a change of strategy. Now,
recalling that the random variables T1(x) are the first arrival times of the independent rate one
Poisson processes used to construct the process and therefore are independent and exponentially
distributed with rate one, our choice of s implies that
ui(D) = Binomial (ζ
i
0(D), 1− e−ns) = Binomial (ζi0(D), 1− 2−n). (4.8)
Note also that, since the initial number of type i players in D minus the number of those players
that have updated their strategy by time ns must exceed the number of type i players in D at all
times before time ns, we have for all t ∈ (0, ns)
{ζit(D) ≤ 2−(n+1)K} ∩ {ζi0(D) ≥ K} ⊂ {ui(D) ≥ (1− 2−(n+1))K}. (4.9)
Using (4.8)–(4.9) and (4.7) with p = 2−n and z = 2−(n+1), we get
P (ζit(D) ≤ 2−(n+1)K for some time t ∈ (0, ns) | ζi0(D) ≥ K)
≤ P (ui(D) ≥ (1− 2−(n+1))K | ζi0(D) = K)
= P (Binomial (K, 1− 2−n) ≥ (1− 2−(n+1))K)
= P (Binomial (K, 2−n) ≤ 2−(n+1)K) ≤ exp(−2−(n+3)K).
This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Moving the players around – We now prove that if the region A has a large number of type 1
players then, regardless of the configuration around this region, we can “move” a positive fraction of
these players to the nearby region B in s units of time. The constant c− defined in (4.6) will play
the role of the fraction of players we can move.
Lemma 13 – Assume (4.5) and let c− as in (4.6) and a > 0. Then,
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ10 (A) ≥ aM) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2) for all M large.
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Proof. The proof of Lemma 12 with D = B, n = 1, and K = aM gives
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ10 (A) ≥ aM and ζ10 (B) ≥ aM)
≤ P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 2−2(aM) for some t ∈ (0, s) | ζ10 (A) ≥ aM and ζ10 (B) ≥ aM)
≤ exp(−2−4 aM) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2)
for all M large. The first inequality follows from the fact that c− ≤ 2−17 < 2−2 while the second
inequality indeed follows from the proof of Lemma 12 since the estimates in this proof only depend
on the initial number of type 1 players in B and the number of sites in this set which are updated
before time s. To complete the proof, it remains to show that
P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | ζ10 (B) ≤ aM ≤ ζ10 (A)) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2) (4.10)
for all M large. To lighten the notation, we let
P ∗(E) := P (E | ζ10 (B) ≤ aM ≤ ζ10 (A)) for any event E
and introduce the two events
A := {ζ1t (A) ≤ 2−2 aM for some time t ∈ (0, s)}
B := {ζ2t (B) ≤ 2−5M2 for some time t ∈ (0, s)}.
(4.11)
The proof of Lemma 12 with K = aM then K = 2−3M2, gives
P ∗(A) ≤ exp(−2−4 aM) and P ∗(B) ≤ exp(−2−7M2). (4.12)
As previously, this follows from the fact that the estimates in the proof of Lemma 12 only depend on
the initial number of players of a given type and the number of sites which are updated in the set
under consideration. Now, observe that, on the intersection of the event that x ∈ A follows strategy 1
and the event Bc, the payoff of the player at x satisfies
φ(x, ξt) ≥ a12 2−5M2 for all t ∈ (0, s).
It follows that, on the event (A ∪B)c, each time a player in the set B updates her strategy, she
remains/becomes of type 1 with probability at least
p1 ≥ (a12 2−5M2)(2−2 aM)((a12 2−5M2)(2−2 aM) + (a21 + a22)(2M + 1)4)−1




for all M sufficiently large. Note that the the second inequality in (4.13) follows from (4.5) while the
last inequality follows from the choice of c− in (4.6). In particular, letting
Xu := card {x ∈ B : T1(x) < s}
X1 := card {x ∈ B : T1(x) < s and ξs(x) = 1}
(4.14)
observing from (4.13) that 2−5M2 p1 ≥ c−(aM), and using (4.8), we deduce that
P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)c)
≤ P (Xu ≤ 2−4M2) + P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)c and Xu > 2−4M2)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, p1) ≤ c−(aM))
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, p1) ≤ 2−5M2 p1)
≤ exp(−2−6M2) + exp(−2−7M2 p1) ≤ (1/2) exp(−(aM)1/2).
(4.15)
Using that X1 ≤ ζ1s (B) and combining (4.12) and (4.15), we conclude that
P ∗(ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM)) ≤ P ∗(A ∪B) + P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)c)
≤ P ∗(A) + P ∗(B) + P (X1 ≤ c−(aM) | (A ∪B)c)
≤ exp(−2−4 aM) + exp(−2−7M2) + (1/2) exp(−(aM)1/2) ≤ exp(−(aM)1/2)
for all M large, which gives (4.10). Note that, for the first inequality above, we also use the fact that
the death-birth updating process ξt is Markov. This completes the proof. 
Creating a pile of players – The next lemma improves the previous one by showing that if the
region A has a large number of type 1 players then the same amount of type 1 players can be created
in the nearby region B. The idea is to first prove that, as long as the number of type 1 players
nearby is small, the number of such players can be increased by a factor c+. Once this threshold
is reached, one can find a small box with a large number of type 1 players and apply the previous
lemma repeatedly to move a fraction of these players to the target set B.
Lemma 14 – Assume that (4.5) holds. Then,











Figure 13: Picture related to the proof of Lemma 14 illustrating the movement of players to nearby
target regions
Proof. To keep track of the amount of type 1 and type 2 players in K5/2, which is the key to
controlling the payoff of the type 1 players in the set A, we set
K := {ζ1t (K5/2) ≥ c+M for some time t ∈ (0, s)}
where c+ has been defined in (4.6). The proof is divided into two steps.
Step 1 – First, we prove that, given ζ10 (A) ≥ M , the event K occurs with high probability. The
idea is to show that the complement of this event confers a large payoff to the type 1 players in the
set A, which results in a large production of such players with high probability, thus leading to a
contradiction. To make this argument precise, we observe that, with probability one,
ζ2t (x+K1) ≥M2 for all x ∈ A and ζ1t (K5/2) ≤ c+M for all t ∈ (0, s)
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on the event Kc.Therefore,
on the event {ξt(x) = 1} ∩Kc,
φ(x, ξt) ≥ a12M2 for all x ∈ A
on the event {ξt(x) = 2} ∩Kc,
φ(x, ξt) ≤ a21 c+M + a22 (2M + 1)2 ≤ 23 a22M2 for all x ∈ K3/2.
In particular, given (A′ ∪K)c where A′ is the first event (4.11) for a = 1, each time a player in B
updates her strategy, she remains/becomes of type 1 with probability at least
q1 ≥ (a12M2)(2−2M)((a12M2)(2−2M) + (23 a22M2)(2M + 1)2)−1
≥ (a12M2)(2−2M)((24 a22M2)(2M + 1)2)−1
≥ 2−9 (a12/a22)M−1.
(4.16)
Defining Xu and X1 as in (4.14), observing that, by (4.5) and (4.16),
2−5M2 q1 ≥ 2−14 (a12/a22)M ≥ c+M
and using (4.8), we deduce that, for all M sufficiently large,
P (X1 ≤ c+M | (A′ ∪K)c)
≤ P (Xu ≤ 2−4M2) + P (X1 ≤ c+M | (A′ ∪K)c and Xu > 2−4M2)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, q1) ≤ c+M)
≤ P (Binomial (M2/4, 1/2) ≤ 2−4M2) + P (Binomial (2−4M2, q1) ≤ 2−5M2 q1)
≤ exp(−2−6M2) + exp(−2−7M2 q1) ≤ (1/4) exp(−M1/2).
(4.17)
Using again X1 ≤ ζ1s (B) and combining (4.12) with a = 1 and (4.17), we get
P (Kc | ζ10 (A) ≥M) = P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c+M and Kc | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (A′ | ζ10 (A) ≥M) + P (ζ1s (B) ≤ c+M | (A′ ∪K)c)
≤ exp(−2−4M) + (1/4) exp(−M1/2)
≤ (1/2) exp(−M1/2)
(4.18)
for all dispersal range M sufficiently large. Note that, for the first inequality above, we also use the
fact that the death-birth updating process ξt is Markov.
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Step 2 – Now, given K, there is a box with at least 5−2 c+M type 1 players. One can move a
fraction of these players to the target set B in at most five steps, applying Lemma 13. To begin
with, we observe that some basic geometry implies that, given K, there exist
B0, . . . , B5 ⊂ K5/2 and t0 ∈ (0, s)
such that the following three conditions hold:
(a) We have ζ1t0(B0) ≥ 5−2 c+M .
(b) For k = 0, . . . , 5, we have card(Bk) = 2−2M2 with B5 = B.
(c) For k = 0, . . . , 4, we have maxj=1,2 |xj − yj | ≤M for all (x, y) ∈ Bk ×Bk+1.
We refer to Figure 13 for an illustration of the worst case scenario where all the type 1 players are
located in one of the corners of K5/2. Under these conditions, we can bring type 1 players to our
target set in at most five steps applying repeatedly Lemma 13. Indeed,
P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 27M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | K)
≤ P (ζ1t0+5s(B5) ≤ 27M | ζ1t0(B0) ≥ 5−2 c+M = 27(c−)−5M)
≤ 1−∏k=0,1,2,3,4 P (ζ1s (Bk+1) ≥ 27(c−)k−4M | ζ10 (Bk) ≥ 27(c−)k−5M)
≤ 1−∏k=0,1,2,3,4 (1− exp(−27/2 (c−)(k−5)/2M1/2))
≤ 1− (1− exp(−27/2M1/2))5
≤ 5× exp(−27/2M1/2) ≤ (1/4) exp(−M1/2)
(4.19)
for all dispersal range M sufficiently large.
Conclusion – Combining (4.18)–(4.19), we deduce that
P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 27M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (Kc | ζ10 (A) ≥M) + P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 27M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | K)
≤ (1/2) exp(−M1/2) + (1/4) exp(−M1/2) = (3/4) exp(−M1/2)
which, applying Lemma 12 with n = 6 and K = 27M , implies that
P (ζ16s(B) ≤M | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
≤ P (ζ1t (B) ≤ 27M for all t ∈ (0, 6s) | ζ10 (A) ≥M)
+ P (ζ16s(B) ≤ 2−7 27M | ζ1t (B) ≥ 27M for some t ∈ (0, 6s))
≤ (3/4) exp(−M1/2) + exp(−2−2M)
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Therefore, for all M large,
P (ζ16s(B) ≤M | ζ10 (A) ≥M) ≤ exp(−M1/2).
This completes the proof. 
Block construction – To deduce coexistence, we use Lemma 14 in combination with some obvious
symmetry and a block construction, a technique that has been introduced in Bramson and Durrett
1988 and is reviewed in Durrett 1995. The idea of the block construction is to define a coupling
between the process under consideration properly rescaled in space and time and supercritical
percolation. More precisely, let H be the directed graph with vertex set
H := {(z, n) ∈ Z2 × Z+ : z1 + z2 + n is even}
and in which there is an oriented edge
(z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if (z′ = z ± e1 or z′ = z ± e2) and n′ = n+ 1
where ej is the jth unit vector. Then, we consider the 14 dependent oriented site percolation process
with density equal to 1−  on this directed graph, i.e., we assume that
P ((zi, ni) is closed for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) = m
whenever |zi − zj | ∨ |ni − nj | > 14 for i 6= j. Then, we set
Bz := (M/2) z + [−M/4,M/4)2 for all z ∈ Z2 and T := 6s = 6 ln(2)
and declare site (z, n) ∈ H to be good whenever
ζinT (Bz) = card {x ∈ Bz : ξnT (x) = i} ≥M for i = 1, 2.
Finally, for all n ∈ N, we define
W n := {z : (z, n) is wet} and Xn := {z : (z, n) is good}
where a site is said to be wet if it can be reached from a directed path of open sites starting at level
zero. The next lemma shows that, for all  > 0, one can find a sufficiently large dispersal range such
that the set of good sites dominates stochastically the set of wet sites. In view of the definition of a
good site, this will imply coexistence of both strategies.
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Lemma 15 – Assume (4.5) and fix  > 0. Then, for all M large,
P (z ∈W n) ≤ P (z ∈ Xn) for all (z, n) ∈ H whenever W 0 ⊂ X0.
Proof. First, we define the collection of events
Bi(z, n) := {ζinT (Bz) ≥M} for all (z, n) ∈ H and i = 1, 2.
Then, since for j = 1, 2,
Bz, Bz±ej ⊂ ((M/2) z ± (M/4) ej) +K1/2 and card(Bz) = card(Bz±ej ) = 2−2M2
we can apply Lemma 14 to get
P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n))
= P (ζ1(n+1)T (Bz±ej ) ≥M for j = 1, 2 | ζ1nT (Bz) ≥M)
≥ 1− 4× P (ζ1(n+1)T (Bz+e1) ≤M | ζ1nT (Bz) ≥M) ≥ 1− 4× exp(−M1/2)
≥ 1− /2
for all M large. Since all the estimates in the proof of Lemma 14 hold uniformly in all possible initial
configurations such that ζ10 (A) ≥M , we also have
P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 |B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n)) ≥ 1− /2.
By symmetry, the same holds for strategy 2, therefore
P (z ± ej ∈ Xn+1 for j = 1, 2 | z ∈ Xn)
= P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) ∩B2(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
≥ − 1 + P (B1(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
+ P (B2(z ± ej , n+ 1) for j = 1, 2 | B1(z, n) ∩B2(z, n))
≥ − 1 + 2 (1− /2) = 1− .
(4.20)
Now, for every (z, n) ∈ H, we let G(z, n) be the set of realizations of the graphical representation
restricted to the finite space-time box
R(z, n) := ((M/2)z, nT ) + (K7/2 × [0, T ])
and such that (z ± ej , n + 1) are good whenever (z, n) is good and G(z, n) occurs. Since all the
estimates in Lemma 14 hold regardless of the configuration outside the spatial region K5/2, it follows
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from (4.20) that the set of realizations G(z, n) has probability at least 1− . In summary, we have a
collection of events that satisfy the following three properties:
(a) G(z, n) is measurable with respect to the graphical representation in R(z, n).
(b) For all M large, we have P (G(z, n)) ≥ 1− .
(c) We have the inclusion G(z, n) ∩ {z ∈ Xn} ⊂ {z ± ej ∈ Xn+1 for j = 1, 2}.
Observing also that
R(z, n) ∩R(z′, n′) = ∅ when |z − z′| ∨ |n− n′| ≥ 2× 7 = 14,
we deduce from Durrett 1995, Theorem 4.3 the existence of a coupling between the long range
death-birth process and the oriented site percolation process such that
P (W n ⊂ Xn) = 1 whenever W 0 ⊂ X0.
The lemma directly follows from the existence of this coupling. 
Using the previous lemma, we can now prove Theorem 7. Fix  > 0 small enough to make the
percolation process supercritical and M accordingly, and observe that
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) = lim inft→∞ P (ξt(0) 6= ξt(y − x))
≥ lim inft→∞ P (ξt(0) 6= ξt(y − x) | 0 ∈W 2bt/Tc)P (0 ∈W 2bt/Tc |W 0 = X0)
(4.21)
for all x, y ∈ Z2. In view of the definition of a good site and the fact that, for the coupling defined in
the proof of Lemma 15, wet sites are also good, the range of the interactions M being fixed, there
exists a positive constant p > 0 that depends on M but not on time t such that
P (ξt(0) 6= ξt(y − x) | 0 ∈W 2bt/Tc) ≥ p > 0 for all x 6= y. (4.22)
Now, starting from a product measure with a positive density of both strategies, the number of good
sites at level zero is almost surely infinite. Since in addition  has been fixed so that the percolation
process is supercritical, we deduce that
lim infn→∞ P (0 ∈W 2n |W 0 = X0) > 0. (4.23)
Combining (4.21)–(4.23), we conclude that, for all M large,
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) 6= ξt(y)) ≥ p lim infn→∞ P (0 ∈W 2n |W 0 = X0) > 0
for all x 6= y. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.
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4.3 Coupling With Modified Voter Models
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 8. The common ingredient to prove both parts
of the theorem is to couple the process with the modified voter models ζ1t and ζ2t whose transitions
at vertex x are given by the following expressions
i → j at rate ci→j(x, ζi) := (1− ) fj(x, ζi) +  1{fi(x, ζi) = 0}
j → i at rate cj→i(x, ζi) := (1− ) fi(x, ζi) +  1{fi(x, ζi) 6= 0}.
for {i, j} = {1, 2} and where
fj(x, ζ
i) = card {y ∈ Nx : ζi(x) = j}/ cardNx = (1/N)Nj(x, ζi)
denotes the fraction of neighbors of vertex x in state j. In words, the transition rates indicate that
particles are updated at rate one and that, at the time of an update,
• with probability 1−  > 0, the new type is chosen uniformly at random from the interaction
neighborhood just like in the voter model,
• with probability  > 0, the new type is i unless all the neighbors are of type j.
The results of Lanchier 2013, section 3 show using duality that type i particles win for this
process. In particular, to prove that strategy 1 wins, it suffices to prove that the set of type 1 players
in the death-birth process dominates stochastically its counterpart in ζ1t , which follows from
ξ ≤ ζ1 and ξ(x) = ζ1(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ c1→2(x, ζ1) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ c2→1(x, ζ1)
according to Theorem III.1.5 in Liggett 1985. Since in addition the transition rates of the modified
voter models are monotone with respect to the number of neighbors of each type, in order to show
that strategy 1 wins, it suffices to prove that the simplified implication
N1(x, ξ) = N1(x, ζ
1) and ξ(x) = ζ1(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ c1→2(x, ζ1) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ c2→1(x, ζ1)
(4.24)
holds for some  > 0. By symmetry, strategy 2 wins if the implication
N2(x, ξ) = N2(x, ζ
2) and ξ(x) = ζ2(x) implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥ c1→2(x, ζ2) and p2→1(x, ξ) ≤ c2→1(x, ζ2)
(4.25)
holds for some  > 0. Using (4.24), we now prove Theorem 8.a.
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Lemma 16 – Recall that a21 > a12. Then, strategy 1 wins when
min (a12 − a22, a11 − a21) > (N − 1)(a21 − a12).
Proof. In view of the discussion above, it suffices to prove that (4.24) holds. First, we observe that,
when the fraction of type 1 neighbors of vertex x is equal to either zero or one, the transition rates
are the same for both processes so it remains to prove (4.24) under the assumption
N1N2 6= 0 where Nj := Nj(x, ξ) = Nj(x, ζ1) for j = 1, 2. (4.26)
The transition rate at vertex x depends on the payoff of its neighbors, and the main idea is to express
the transition rates by distinguishing between the part of the payoff coming from x and the part
of the payoff coming from the other neighbors’ neighbors. In order to make this distinction, we
introduce the following four weighting factors:
wij :=
∑
y∼x (1{ξ(y) = i}
∑
z∼y,z 6=x 1{ξ(z) = j}) for i, j = 1, 2.
That is, wij is the number of type j neighbors (excluding vertex x) of a type i neighbor of vertex x
counted with order of multiplicity. Note that, for i = 1, 2, we have
Ni +
∑
j=1,2 wij = NNi. (4.27)
In addition, for i 6= j, the transition rates can be expressed as
pi→j(x, ξ) =
(Nj + wji) aji + wjj ajj
(Ni + wii) aii + wij aij + (Nj + wji) aji + wjj ajj
. (4.28)
Using (4.27)–(4.28), we now prove that (4.24) holds in the nontrivial case (4.26).
Transition 1→ 2 – Using (4.27) and a22 < a12 < a21, we get
(N2 + w21) a21 + w22 a22 ≤ (N2 + w21 + w22) a21 = NN2 a21
(N1 + w11) a11 + w12 a12 = (N1 + w11 + w12) a11 + w12 (a12 − a11)
= NN1 a11 + w12 (a12 − a11).
This, together with (4.28) for i = 1 and j = 2, implies that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ NN2 a21
NN1 a11 + w12 (a12 − a11) +NN2 a21
=
NN2 a21





where, since a11 − a21 > (N − 1)(a21 − a12),
ρ1 := NN1 (a11 − a21) + w12 (a12 − a11)
= (NN1 − w12)(a11 − a21) + w12 (a12 − a21)
> (N − 1)(NN1 − w12)(a21 − a12) + w12 (a12 − a21)
= N ((N − 1)N1 − w12)(a21 − a12) = N w11 (a21 − a12) ≥ 0.
(4.30)
Note that the strict inequality holds because (4.26)–(4.27) imply that
NN1 − w12 = (N1 + w11 + w12)− w12 = N1 + w11 ≥ N1 > 0.
In view of (4.29)–(4.30), there exists 1 > 0 small such that
p1→2(x, ξ) ≤ NN2 a21 (N2a21 + ρ1)−1 = N2 (N + (ρ1/Na21))−1
≤ (1− ) f2(x, ξ) = (1− ) f2(x, ζ1) = c1→2(x, ζ1)
whenever  < 1 and (4.26) holds.
Transition 2→ 1 – Since a11 > a21 > a12 and a22 − a12 < (N − 1)(a12 − a21), using the previous
estimates and obvious symmetry, we show that
p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ NN1 a12 (N2a12 + ρ2)−1 where ρ2 < N w22 (a12 − a21) ≤ 0.
In particular, there exists 2 > 0 small such that
p2→1(x, ξ) ≥ N1 (N + (ρ2/Na12))−1
≥ (1− ) f1(x, ξ) +  = (1− ) f1(x, ζ1) +  = c2→1(x, ζ1)
whenever  < 2 and (4.26) holds.
In conclusion, the implication (4.24) holds for  smaller than min (1, 2) > 0, which shows that
strategy 1 wins under the assumptions of the lemma. 
Repeating the proof of Lemma 16 step by step but exchanging the role of both strategies only
shows that strategy 2 wins under the strong assumption a11 < a12 < a21 < a22. In fact, this sufficient
condition for strategy 2 to win can be easily improved to
max (a11, a12) < min (a21, a22)
by using a coupling between the death-birth process and a biased voter model with a selective
advantage for type 2 particles to show that the former dominates the latter. To prove that strategy 2
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wins in the larger region stated in Theorem 8.b, we couple the death-birth process with the second
modified voter model ζ2t but using techniques different from the ones used to show the first part
of the theorem. To explain the assumptions of the theorem, we note that our approach requires
the interaction neighborhood to have a certain connectivity property which does not hold in the
one-dimensional nearest neighbor case. First, we introduce the payoff functions
φ1(z) := a11 (z/N) + a12 (1− z/N) = (a11 − a12)(z/N) + a12
φ2(z) := a22 (z/N) + a21 (1− z/N) = (a22 − a21)(z/N) + a21
for all z = 0, 1, . . . , N , and let a := max (a11, a12, a21, a22) and
M+ := maxz φ1(z) ≥ maxz 6=N φ1(z) =: M−
m− := minz φ2(z) ≤ minz 6=N φ2(z) =: m+.
The following lemma gives a sufficient condition on these minimum and maximum payoffs for
strategy 2 to win. This condition is made more explicit in the subsequent lemma.
Lemma 17 – Strategy 2 wins whenever (M,d) 6= (1, 1) and
(N − 1)m+ > (N − 2)M+ +M− and (N − 1)M− < (N − 2)m− +m+. (4.31)
Proof. Following as in the proof of Lemma 16, it suffices to show that (4.25) holds. This is again
trivial when the fraction of type 1 neighbors of vertex x is equal to either zero or one so we focus
from now on on the nontrivial case where
N1N2 6= 0 where Nj := Nj(x, ξ) = Nj(x, ζ2) for j = 1, 2, (4.32)
indicating that x has two neighbors y∗ and z∗ with different strategies. Except in the one-dimensional
nearest neighbor case M = d = 1, one can find two vertices y∗ and z∗ such that
y∗, z∗ 6= x and y∗ ∈ Nx ∩Ny∗ and z∗ ∈ Nx ∩Nz∗ and y∗ ∈ Nz∗
and we may assume that y∗ and z∗ are neighbors of each other:
ξ(y∗) = 1 and ξ(z∗) = 2 and y∗, z∗ ∈ Nx and y∗ ∈ Nz∗ .
The rest of the proof is divided into two steps depending on the transition.
Transition 1→ 2 – Assume that ξ(x) = ζ2(x) = 1. Then for all y ∈ Nx,
φ(y, ξ) ≤M+ when ξ(y) = 1 while φ(y, ξ) ≥ m+ when ξ(y) = 2.
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In addition, we have φ(y∗, ξ) ≤M− therefore
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥ m+N2
(N1 − 1)M+ +M− +m+N2
=
m+N2
(m+ −M+)N2 + (N − 1)M+ +M− .
(4.33)
Now, for all z ∈ [0, N ], we define the functions
g1(z) :=
m+ z




Since (N − 1)m+ > (N − 2)M+ +M−,
g1(1) =
m+




We then distinguish two cases.
Case 1 – When M+ > m+, it follows from (4.34) that
g1(z) ≥ g1(1) z > z/N for all z ∈ [1, N − 1]
therefore g1(z) ≥ h1(z) for all  > 0 small by continuity.









for all  > 0 small according to (4.34), while
g1(N) =
Nm+
Nm+ −M+ +M− ≥ 1 = h1(N).
The previous two inequalities together with the fact that the function g1 is concave imply that g1
dominates h1 for all  > 0 small (see Figure 14 for a picture).
Recalling (4.33), we deduce that, in both cases and when (4.32) holds,
p1→2(x, ξ) ≥ g1(N2) ≥ h1(N2) = c1→2(x, ζ2)
which proves the first inequality in (4.25).
Transition 2→ 1 – Assume that ξ(x) = ζ2(x) = 2. Then for all y ∈ Nx,
φ(y, ξ) ≤M− when ξ(y) = 1 while φ(y, ξ) ≥ m− when ξ(y) = 2.
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In addition, we have φ(z∗, ξ) ≥ m+ therefore
p2→1(x, ξ) ≤ M−N1
M−N1 + (N2 − 1)m− +m+
=
M−N1
(M− −m−)N1 + (N − 1)m− +m+ .
(4.35)
Now, for all z ∈ [0, N ], we define the functions
g2(z) :=
M− z




Since (N − 1)M− < (N − 2)m− +m+ ≤ (N − 1)m+,
g2(1) =
M−
M− + (N − 2)m− +m+ <
1
N
g2(N − 1) = (N − 1)M−





As before, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 – When M− > m−, it follows from (4.36) that
g2(z) ≤ g2(1) z < z/N for all z ∈ [1, N − 1]
therefore g2(z) ≤ h2(z) for all  > 0 small by continuity.
Case 2 – When M− ≤ m−, the function g2 is convex. Moreover,
g2(N − 1) ≥ (1− 1/N)(1− ) = h2(N − 1) for  > 0 small
g2(0) = h2(0) = 0
where the first inequality follows from (4.36). This again implies that h2 dominates g2 for all  > 0
small, and we refer to the right-hand side of Figure 14 for a picture.
Recalling (4.35), we deduce that, in both cases and when (4.32) holds,
p2→1(x, ξ) ≤ g2(N1) ≤ h2(N1) = c2→1(x, ζ2)
which proves the second inequality in (4.25). This completes the proof.

To complete the proof of Theorem 8, the last step is to re-express the condition in the previous
lemma using the payoff coefficients.
Lemma 18 – Let a12 < a21 and (M,D) 6= (1, 1). Then (4.31) holds whenever
(N2 −N − 1) max (a11 − a21, a12 − a22, a11 − a22) < a21 − a12. (4.37)
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Figure 14: Picture related to the proof of Lemma 17 illustrating the concavity arguments
Proof. We distinguish four cases depending on the sign of a11 − a12 and a22 − a21.
Case 1 – When a11 < a12 and a22 > a21, we have
M+ = M− = a12 and m− = m+ = a21
therefore (4.31) holds if and only if a12 < a21, which is true by assumption.
Case 2 – When a11 > a12 and a22 > a21, we have
M+ = a11, M− = a11 + (1/N)(a12 − a11), m− = m+ = a21.
Using some basic algebra, we deduce that (4.31) holds if and only if
(N2 −N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12 and (N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12
therefore (4.31) holds if and only if (N2 −N − 1)(a11 − a21) < a21 − a12.
Case 3 – Assume that a11 < a12 and a22 < a21. This case can be deduced from the previous one by
symmetry exchanging the role of the two strategies, and we find that
(4.31) holds if and only if (N2 −N − 1)(a12 − a22) < a21 − a12.
Case 4 – When a11 > a12 and a22 < a21, it is easier to prove the result graphically and we refer to
the phase diagram of Figure 11 for an illustration of some of the arguments of the proof. In this
case, the minimum and maximum payoffs are given by
M+ = a11 and M− = a11 + (1/N)(a12 − a11)
m− = a22 and m+ = a22 + (1/N)(a21 − a22)
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so the two inequalities in (4.31) are respectively equivalent to
(N − 1)2 a22 > (N2 −N − 1) a11 + a12 − (N − 1) a21
(N − 1)2 a11 < (N2 −N − 1) a22 + a21 − (N − 1) a12.
(4.38)
Since in addition a11 > a12 and a22 < a21, this specifies two triangles with two common sides, one
vertical side and one horizontal side that intersect at point
p := (a12, a21) in the a11 − a22 plane.
For the first inequality in (4.38), the third side of the triangle is the segment line going through
point p+ and with slope s+ where
p+ := (a21 + (N
2 −N − 1)−1 (a21 − a12), a21)
s+ := (N
2 −N − 1)(N − 1)−2 = 1 + (N − 2)(N − 1)−2 > 1.
(4.39)
Using some obvious symmetry, one finds that the third side of the triangle specified by the second
inequality in (4.38) is characterized by the point and slope
p− := (a12, a12 − (N2 −N − 1)−1 (a21 − a12)) and s− = 1/s+ < 1. (4.40)
Since the segment line connecting p− and p+ has slope one, the triangle (p, p−, p+) is contained in
the intersection of the two triangles specified by (4.39)–(4.40). In particular, whenever the payoff
coefficients are in this triangle, which is equivalent to
a11 > a12 and a22 < a21 and (N2 −N − 1)(a11 − a22) < a21 − a12,
the two inequalities in (4.38) hold.
Since all four cases hold simultaneously when (4.37) holds, the proof is complete. 
Theorem 8.b directly follows from Lemmas 17 and 18.
4.4 Coupling With a Pure Growth Process
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 9 which states that, the other payoffs being fixed,
strategy 1 wins whenever the payoff coefficient a11 is sufficiently large. The intuition behind this
result, which is also the first step of the proof, is to observe that, in the limit as a11 goes to infinity,
type 1 players with at least one neighbor of their own type never change their strategy. In particular,
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the set of type 1 players dominates a Richardson model Richardson 1973, i.e., a contact process with
no death, which obviously implies that strategy 1 wins. Using a block construction and the fact that
the transition rates are continuous functions of the payoffs, we deduce that the process reaches an
equilibrium with a density of type 1 close to one when a11 is finite but large. The rest of the proof
consists in showing that we can indeed convert the remaining type 2 players, which directly follows
from percolation results already established in Durrett 1992; Lanchier 2013.
To turn our sketch into a rigorous proof, we let ζt be the d-dimensional Richardson model with
parameter µ. In this spin system, each vertex of the d-dimensional integer lattice is either empty
or occupied by a particle. Each particle produces a new particle which is then sent to a neighbor
chosen uniformly at random at rate µ. This results in either an empty site becoming occupied
or two particles coalescing in case the target site is already occupied. In addition, occupied sites
remain occupied forever. More formally, using the usual notation 0 for empty and 1 for occupied,
the transition rates of the process at vertex x are given by
c0→1(x, ζ) = µ f1(x, ζ) and c1→0(x, ζ) = 0.
In order to compare the process properly rescaled in space and time with oriented site percolation,
we also introduce the space-time regions
BK := [−K,K]d and BK(z) := Kz +BK for all z ∈ Zd.
Then, we have the following lemma, where the processes under consideration have been identified to
the set of vertices in state 1 to lighten the expressions.
Lemma 19 – For all a,  > 0 there exist A,K, c <∞ such that
P (B2K 6⊂ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) |BK ⊂ ξ0) ≤ 
whenever max (a21, a22) ≤ a and a11 > A.
Proof. Note that, even in the limit as a11 →∞, a type 1 player can change her strategy if all her
neighbors follow strategy 2. However, since we have
φ(x, ξ) ≥ a11N1(x, ξ) ≥ a11 when x ∈ ξ and f1(x, ξ) 6= 0
φ(x, ξ) ≤ (2M + 1)d max (a21, a22) when x /∈ ξ,
the rate at which each of two type 1 players located in the same interaction neighborhood changes her
strategy goes to zero in the limit as a11 →∞. In addition, each type 2 player in the neighborhood of
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one of these two type 1 players changes her strategy with probability converging to one at the next
update, which gives the following limits:
p1→2(x, ξ) → 0 when f1(x, ξ) 6= 0
p2→1(x, ξ) → 1 when f1(x, ξ) f1(y, ξ) 6= 0 for some y ∈ Nx.
(4.41)
Also, since a type 2 player can change her strategy only if she has a type 1 neighbor,
x ∈ ξt implies that f1(x, ξt) 6= 0 for all times t
provided this holds at time zero. In particular, the transition rates in (4.41) indeed describe the
death-birth process in the limit as a11 →∞ whenever each type 1 player has initially at least one
type 1 neighbor. Note that the same property holds for the Richardson model: because there is no
death and because each particle newly created must be in the neighborhood of its parent, the set of
occupied sites satisfies the following connectivity property:
x ∈ ζt implies that f1(x, ζt) 6= 0 for all times t (4.42)
provided this holds at time zero. Combining (4.41)–(4.42) and using that the set BK is connected,
we deduce that the death-birth process can be coupled with the Richardson model with parameter
one in such a way that, for all fixed K, c > 0,
P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK)→ 0 (4.43)
as a11 →∞.Note that the death-birth process dominates the Richardson model with a probability
that goes to one only in finite space-time regions. In particular, the limit in (4.43) only holds for
finite c and K. In other respects, it directly follows from the shape theorem Richardson 1973 for the
Richardson model that there exists a positive constant c > 0 such that
P (B2K 6⊂ ζt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | BK ⊂ ζ0)
= P (B2K 6⊂ ζcK | BK ⊂ ζ0) ≤ P (B2K 6⊂ ζcK | ζ0 = {0}) ≤ /2
(4.44)
for all K large. Now, fix K, c > 0 such that (4.44) holds. Since the transition rates of the death-birth
updating process are continuous with respect to the payoff coefficients and since the space-time
region in the event in (4.43) is finite, there is A <∞ such that
P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK) ≤ /2 (4.45)
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for all a11 > A. Combining (4.44)–(4.45), we conclude that
P (B2K 6⊂ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) |BK ⊂ ξ0)
≤ P (B2K 6⊂ ζt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | BK ⊂ ζ0)
+ P (B2K ∩ ζt 6⊂ B2K ∩ ξt for some t ∈ (cK, 2cK) | ζ0 = ξ0 = BK)
≤ /2 + /2 = 
for all a11 > A. This completes the proof. 
From the lemma, we deduce that, starting from a product measure with a positive density of type 1
players, the density of type 1 at equilibrium is close to one when a11 is large. To prove this, we
consider as previously the directed graph H with vertex set
H := {(z, n) ∈ Zd × Z+ : z1 + z2 + · · ·+ zd + n is even}
and in which there is an edge (z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if
z′ = z ± ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n′ = n+ 1.
Then, calling (z, n) ∈ H an occupied site when
BK(z) ⊂ ξt for all t ∈ cnK + (0, cK)
it follows from Lemma 19 that, for all  > 0, one can choose a11 large enough so that the set of
occupied sites dominates stochastically the set of wet sites in the percolation process where sites are
closed with probability . Since the probability  can be made arbitrarily small, the density of type 1
players at equilibrium can be made arbitrarily close to one.
The last step is to turn the remaining type 2 players into type 1 players. To do this, the basic idea
is to rely on the lack of percolation of the dry (not wet) sites for a certain oriented site percolation
process where sites are closed with a sufficiently small probability . The fact that the set of dry sites
does not percolate for small positive  is proved in Durrett 1992, section 3 for the percolation process
described above. This result, however, is not sufficient to conclude because the lack of percolation
of the dry sites for this percolation process does not imply extinction of strategy 2. To solve the
problem, we consider oriented site percolation on a directed graph H+ that has the same vertex set
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as before but additional arrows, namely
(z, n)→ (z′, n′) if and only if
z′ = z ± ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n′ = n+ 1
or z′ = z ± 2ej for some j = 1, 2, . . . , d and n′ = n.
The process on H+ has the following two key properties:
1. As for the process on H , the dry sites do not percolate if sites are closed with a small enough
probability  > 0. This is proved in Lanchier 2013, section 3 following the ideas in Durrett
1992.
2. Recalling that the death-birth process and the percolation process on H are coupled in such a
way that the set of occupied sites dominates the set of wet sites, if
ξt(x) = 2 for some (x, t) ∈ BK(z)× (cnK, c(n+ 1)K)
then site (z, n) can be reached by a directed path of dry sites embedded in H+. This second
property is also established in Lanchier 2013, section 3. Even though the proof applies to
another model, it easily extends to the death-birth process because it only relies on the fact
that a type 2 player can only appear in the neighborhood of a type 2 player.
To deduce extinction of strategy 2, we first fix  > 0 small such that the set of dry sites does not
percolate for the percolation process on the directed graph H+. Then, we take a11 large enough so
that the set of occupied sites dominates the set of wet sites in the percolation process on the smaller
directed graph H . Finally, it follows from the second property above that, because the dry sites do
not percolate, the type 2 players do not survive.
4.5 The Prisoner’s Dilemma in One Dimension
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 11 which focuses on the one-dimensional death-
birth process with nearest neighbor interactions. First, we explain where the mysterious expressions
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for D3 and D4 in the statement of the theorem come from. To do so, we let
pi(n1, n2) := the rate at which a type i player with
one type 1 neighbor that has n1 type 1 neighbors and
one type 2 neighbor that has n2 type 2 neighbors
update her strategy
for i = 1, 2 and n1, n2 = 0, 1, 2, and note that
p1(n1, n2) =
(2− n2) a21 + n2 a22
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12 + (2− n2) a21 + n2 a22
p2(n1, n2) =
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12
n1 a11 + (2− n1) a12 + (2− n2) a21 + n2 a22 .
Now, for the process starting with only 1s to the left of the origin, we let
Xt := inf {x ∈ Z : ξt(x) = 2} − 1 and Kt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+Xt) = 1}
be the position of the rightmost type 1 player with only type 1 players to her left and the distance
between this type 1 player and the closest type 1 player to her right. Then, letting
Dj(ξt) := limh→ 0 h−1E (Xt+h −Xt | ξt and Kt = j)
we have the following almost sure estimates
1 1 1 2 1
· · · • • • ◦ • × × D2(ξt) = D2 = 2− p1(2, 0)
1 1 1 2 2 1
· · · • • • ◦ ◦ • × D3(ξt) = D3 = p2(1, 1)− p1(2, 1)
1 1 1 2 2 2
· · · • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ × Dj(ξt) = D4 = p2(1, 2)− p1(2, 1)
for all j > 3 and where × means type 1 or type 2. In particular, D3 and D4 are possible drifts of the
interface at Xt depending on its distance to the next type 1 player. Also, plugging the expression of
the rates pi(n1, n2) above into D3 and D4, we obtain
D3 =
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + a21 + a22
− a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
D4 =
a11 + a12
a11 + a12 + 2a22
− a21 + a22
2a11 + a21 + a22
.
which are exactly the expressions given before the statement of Theorem 11.
Before studying the process starting from general initial configurations, we look at the process
starting from configurations that have a finite interval of type 1 players, only type 2 players to the
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left of this interval and infinitely many players of each type to the right. In picture, this looks like
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
· · · ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ × × × · · ·
For the process starting from this configuration, we let
Z−t := inf {x ∈ Z : ξt(x) = 1} and Mt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+ Z−t ) = 2}
be the position of the leftmost type 1 player and the distance between this type 1 player and the
closest type 2 player to her right. Then, we have the following result.
Lemma 20 – Assume that a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0. Then,
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞|M0 > 3) ≥ c for some c > 0.
Proof. To begin with, we let Zt := e−aMt where a > 0 and
Z+t := Z
−
t +Mt − 1 and Kt := inf {x > 0 : ξt(x+ Z+t ) = 1}
be the right boundary of the type 1 interval starting at Z−t and the distance between this type 1
player and the closest type 1 player to her right. Then, we have
limh→ 0 h−1 P (Z+t+h = Z
+
t + 1 | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3) = p2(1, 1)
limh→ 0 h−1 P (Z+t+h = Z
+
t − 1 | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3) = p1(2, 1)
(4.46)
with probability one, while for the left boundary Z−t ,
limh→ 0 h−1 P (Z−t+h = Z
−
t + 1 | ξt and Mt > 3) = p1(2, 1)
limh→ 0 h−1 P (Z−t+h = Z
−
t − 1 | ξt and Mt > 3) = p2(1, 2).
(4.47)
Now, for every integer j > 1, we define
Φj(a) := limh→ 0 h−1E (Zt+h − Zt | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = j).
Since Mt = Z+t − Z−t + 1, it follows from (4.46)–(4.47) that
Φ3(a) := limh→ 0 h−1E (Zt+h − Zt | ξt and Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
= Zt (e
−a − 1) limh→ 0 h−1 P (Mt+h −Mt = 1 |Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
+ Zt (e
a − 1) limh→ 0 h−1 P (Mt+h −Mt = −1 |Mt > 3 and Kt = 3)
= (e−a − 1)(p2(1, 1) + p2(1, 2))Zt + 2 (ea − 1) p1(2, 1)Zt
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therefore, taking the derivative at a = 0, we get
Φ′3(0) = −(p2(1, 1) + p2(1, 2))Zt + 2 p1(2, 1)Zt = −(D3 +D4)Zt.
Using the same approach, we prove in general that
Φ′j(0) = −(Dj∧4 +D4)Zt ≤ −(D3 +D4)Zt < 0 for all j > 1
since D3 < D4 < D2 when a22 < a21. In particular,
Φj(b) ≤ Φj(0) = 0 for some b > 0 fixed from now on
showing that, as long as Mt > 3, the process Zt is a supermartingale with respect to the natural
filtration of the death-birth process. To conclude, we now apply the optional stopping theorem to
this supermartingale using the stopping times
τ3 := inf {t : Mt ≤ 3} and τn := inf {t : Mt ≥ n} for all n > 3.
Since Tn := min(τ3, τn) is finite, whenever M0 > 3,
e−4b ≥ E (Z0) ≥ E (ZTn)
≥ E (ZTn |Tn = τ3)P (Tn = τ3) + E (ZTn |Tn = τn)P (Tn = τn)
≥ e−3b (1− P (Tn = τn)) + e−nb P (Tn = τn).
(4.48)
Since the event {Tn = τn} is nonincreasing with respect to n for the inclusion, we also deduce from
the monotone convergence theorem that
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞)
≥ P (Tn = τn for all n > 3) = limn→∞ P (Tn = τn).
(4.49)
Combining (4.48)–(4.49), we deduce that
P (Mt > 3 for all t > 0 and Mt →∞|M0 > 3)
≥ limn→∞ P (Tn = τn) ≥ limn→∞ (e−3b − e−4b)(e−3b − e−nb)−1
≥ (e−3b − e−4b) e3b = 1− e−b
therefore the lemma holds for c := 1− e−b > 0. 
To deal with the process starting from product measures, we note that every realization induces











≤ −D3 ≥ D3D4 −D4
Figure 15: Picture related to the proof of Lemma 21 illustrating the collapsing (finite) clusters of type
2 in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
assuming that there is initially a type 2 at the origin, we define the type 2 connected component
starting at the origin as
C0 := {(x, t) ∈ Z× R+ : there is a path (0, 0)→2 (x, t) going forward}
where (0, 0)→2 (x, t) means that there are times and vertices
0 = t1 < t2 < · · · < tn+1 = t and 0 = x1, x2, . . . , xn = x
such that the following condition is satisfied:
(ξs(xj) = 2 for all tj ≤ s ≤ tj+1) holds for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 21 – Assume that a22 < a21 and D3 +D4 > 0. Then,
T := inf {t > 0 : C0 ∩ (Z× (t,∞)) = ∅} <∞ with probability one.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction, showing that when A := {T = ∞} occurs, its complement
occurs with probability one. To begin with, note that
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• on the event A, the type 2 connected component C0 is unbounded and
• since there are infinitely many type 1 players on both sides of the origin at time zero, this
property remains true at all times.
From these two observations, we deduce that
0 < card {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0} <∞ for all t ∈ (0,∞)
which, in turn, implies that the left boundary lt and right boundary rt of the type 2 connected
component satisfy the following properties at all times:
−∞ < lt := inf {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0}
≤ sup {x ∈ Z : (x, t) ∈ C0} =: rt <∞.
We also observe that
M−t := inf {x > 0 : ξt(lt − x) = 2} > 1
M+t := inf {x > 0 : ξt(rt + x) = 2} > 1.
(4.50)
Figure 15 gives an illustration of these processes. Now, the evolution rules of the death-birth updating
process clearly imply that there exist c1, c2 > 0 such that
P (min (M−t+1,M
+
t+1) > 3 | min (M−t ,M+t ) > 1) ≥ c1
P (T < t+ 1 | rt − lt ≤ 3) ≥ c2
(4.51)
while it follows from Lemma 20 that
P (inf {t > s : min (M−t ,M+t ) ≤ 3}
≥ inf {t > s : rt − lt ≤ 3} | min (M−s ,M+s ) > 3) ≥ c2 > 0.
(4.52)
Combining (4.50)–(4.52), we conclude that
A = {T =∞} occurs implies that min (M−t ,M+t ) > 1 at all times
implies that min (M−t ,M
+
t ) > 3 infinitely often
implies that rt − lt ≤ 3 infinitely often
implies that T <∞ with probability one.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 22 – Assume that a22 > a21 and D4 > 0. Then,
T := inf {t > 0 : C0 ∩ (Z× (t,∞)) = ∅} <∞ with probability one.
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Proof. First, we note that the conclusion of Lemma 20 holds as well under the assumptions of the
present lemma, since whenever a22 > a21 we have
D4 < D3 < D2 and Dj∧4 +D4 ≥ 2D4 for all j > 1.
In particular, the lemma follows by repeating the proof of Lemma 21. 
Finally, under the assumptions of Theorem 11 and conditional on the origin being initially
occupied by a type 2 player, it follows from Lemmas 21–22 that the type 2 connected starting at the
origin is bounded with probability one. Since in addition the number of players is countable, for
every vertex x ∈ Z, we have
lim inft→∞ P (ξt(x) = 1) = 1− lim supt→∞ P (ξt(x) = 2)
≥ 1− P (ξ0(y) = 2 and Ty =∞ for some y ∈ Z)
≥ 1−∑y:ξ0(y)=2 P (Ty =∞) = 1
where Ty denotes the time at which the connected component starting at vertex y dies out, as defined
in the statement of Lemmas 21–22. This proves Theorem 11.
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APPENDIX A
PAYOFFS AFFECTING BIRTH AND DEATH RATES
78
This appendix gives a summary of the proofs and results given in Lanchier 2015 analyzing a
particular evolutionary game in the framework of interacting particle systems. The process studied
here, in which payoffs affect birth and death rates, is an evolutionary game where players either die
or give birth depending on the sign of their payoff, and at an exponential rate equal to the magnitude
of their payoff. If the player dies, she is replaced by a neighbor chosen uniformly at random, and if
the player gives birth, then a neighbor is chosen uniformly at random to be replaced by the player’s
offspring.
A.1 Model Description
More specifically, the model studied in Lanchier 2015 is a continuous-time Markov chain ηt whose
state at time t is a spatial configuration
ηt : Zd −→ {1, 2} := the set of strategies.
If the player at vertex x has a positive payoff φ > 0, then at rate φ, a neighbor of x is chosen
uniformly at random to be replaced by (adopt the strategy of) x, simulating the player at x giving
birth. If the player at vertex x has a negative payoff, then at rate |φ|, she is replaced by (adopts the
strategy of) one of her neighbors chosen uniformly at random, simulating the player at x dying and












φ(y, η)1{φ1(x, η) < 0} 1{η(x) 6= η(y)} [f(ηx)− f(η)]
(A.1)
where N is the number of neighbors, the configuration ηx is obtained from η by changing the strategy
at vertex x and leaving the strategies at all other vertices unchanged.
The first theorem shows that local interactions induce a reduction in the coexistence and bistable
regions that are implied by replicator dynamics.
A.2 Results
The results proved in Lanchier 2015 are given next, except that the roles of strategy 1 and
strategy 2 are exchanged here in order to maintain consistency with the following chapters where we
prescribe a21 > a12.
79
Theorem 23 – Assume that a21 > a12. Then strategy 2 wins whenever
max(a11, a12)−min(a22, a21) < (N − 1)−1(a21 − a12).
The proof of Theorem 23 relies on demonstrating a coupling between the spatial game and a biased
voter model that favors strategy 2. The main idea here is to write the transition rates by distinguishing
between transitions due to births from those due to deaths. Viewing the transition rates in this way,
it can be shown that for certain choices of payoff parameters, the set of type 2 individuals in the
spatial game is stochastically dominated by the set of type 2 individuals in the biased voter model.
Since type 2 wins in the biased voter model, it also wins in the spatial game.
The next theorem serves two purposes. First, as the theorem is stated, it shows that the parameter
region in which the replicator equation is bistable but the spatial game has a unique ESS is much
larger than the parameter region given by Theorem 23 alone. Second, by symmetry, the role of
strategies 1 and 2 can be exchanged in the theorem to show that regardless of any advantage given
to strategy 2 by the payoff ordering a21 > a12 or by the choice of a22, there are always values of a11
sufficiently large that strategy 1 will win in the spatial model. Let a¯22 := (a21, a12, a11).
Theorem 24 – For all a¯22 there exists m(a¯22) <∞ such that
strategy 2 wins whenever a22 > m(a¯22).
The proof of Theorem 24 as well as Theorems 25 and 27 below all rely on the use of a block
construction (see Durrett 1995), by which we mean a coupling between a particular auxiliary process
that tracks certain “good” events and a supercritical percolation process after appropriate rescaling
in time and space. What we mean by “good” events changes according to the theorem, as do the
methods required to exhibit the coupling. Common to all three theorems is the use of a so-called
Harris Graphical Representation, in which the process is shown to be identical to a particular process
on a space-time graph constructed by a collection of Poisson point processes. In the proof of Theorem
24, this graphical representation is first used to prove that strategy 2 survives by a comparison with
the Richarson model. Then, it is shown that strategy 1 goes extinct by a block construction, in which
a “good” site is one for which there is some type 1 individual nearby. By showing that the associated
percolation process can be made subcritcal by an appropriate choice of the function m(a¯22), it is
concluded that strategy 1 goes exctinct, so strategy 2 wins.
Theorem 25 demonstrates a further reduction in the coexistence region provided that a21 < 0,
and/or a similar reduction by symmetry if a12 < 0.
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Theorem 25 – For all a¯22 such that a21 < 0, there exists m(a¯22) <∞ such that
strategy 1 wins whenever a22 < −m(a¯22).
The proof of Theorem 25 again relies on a graphical representation and block construction. In this
case, a “good” site is chosen to be one in which there are no type 2 individuals nearby. The very
small (negative) value of a22 assures that the process quickly becomes sparse, in the sense that
the probability to two neighbors both being type 2 is very low. The added condition that a21 < 0
assures that lone type 2 individuals will also be replaced by type 1, which enables a coupling to a
supercritical percolation and shows that strategy 1 wins.
Theorem 26 replaces Theorem 23 in the case of nearest-neighbor interactions on a one-dimensional
lattice. By dropping the assumption that a21 > a12, the symmetric form of this theorem demonstrates
a specific region where type 1 wins (even when a21 > a12), thereby showing agreement with the
replicator dynamics for a large parameter region, and also further reducing the region of bistability.
The second part of the theorem shows that coexistence does not occur except possibly in a measure
zero parameter region corresponding to A /∈M∗2, where
M∗2 := {A = (aij) such that a11a12a21a22(a11 + a12)(a22 + a21) 6= 0 and a11 + a12 6= a22 + a21} .
Theorem 26 – Assume that M = d = 1. Then:
• strategy 2 wins for all a22 > max(a11, a12)− (a21 − a12), and
• the system starting from any translation invariant distribution clusters for all A ∈M∗2.
The proof of the first part of Theorem 26 relies on studying an auxiliary process that keeps track
of the boundaries between clusters of each strategy. This requires the restriction to nearest-neighbor
interactions and the 1-dimensional lattice, but it enables some stronger results. The idea of the proof
is to first consider the process where the initial configuration consists of all type-1 particles to the
left of some fixed value α > 0. Then the leftmost particle can be defined. Using some bounds on
transition rates, a particular auxiliary process is shown to be a supermartingale. By then applying
the optional stopping theorem, the process tracking the leftmost particle is shown to tend to infinity
with a high probability. To get the result for the more general initial condition (any product measure)










PD = Prisoner’s Dilemma
SH = Stag Hunt Game
BS = Battle of the Sexes
HD = Hawk−Dove Game (a21 < 0)









































Figure 16: List of the most popular 2× 2 games on left. On right: phase diagram in the a11 − a22
plane summarizing the results as applied to the one-dimensional, nearest-neighbor spatial game.
The thick, solid line indicates the phase transition suggested by simulations. Dashed lines represent
boundaries given by the results of this paper. BV = Biased Voter Model, RE = Replicatior Equation.
then use some symmetry and the result just mentioned for the restricted initial condition. The
second part of the theorem is proved by showing that the boundary process mentioned above tends
to extinction. This is done by viewing the boundary process as an annihilating random walk and
using some estimates on transition rates to show that in every group of four consecutive particles, at
least one particle is killed after an almost surely finite time.
While the previous theorem showed that coexistence does not occur in the case of nearest-neighbor
interactions on a one-dimensional lattice, the final theorem shows that for any other interaction
range, M , or lattice dimension, d, coexistence does occur.
Theorem 27 – There is m := m(a12, a21) > 0 such that coexistence occurs when
c(M,d)a11 < a22 < −m and c(M,d)a22 < a11 < −m,
where, for each range M and spatial dimension d,
c(M,d) :=
2M((2M + 1)d − 2)
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Figure 17: List of the most popular 2× 2 games on left. On right: summary of the results for the
spatial game. The thick, solid line indicates the phase transition suggested by simulations. Dashed
lines represent boundaries given by the results of this paper. BV = Biased Voter Model, RE =
Replicatior Equation.
As in Theorems 24 and 25, the proof of Theorem 27 also relies on a graphical representation and
block construction. First, focusing on the case a12 = a21 = 0, and an initial condition with just one
type 1 individual, it is shown that the process tracking the rightmost type 1 individual has positive
drift. Using some trigonometry and the geometry of the square lattice, it is then shown that the
Euclidean distance between a certain “tagged” individual and a given target site has negative drift.
These results are used to show that the tagged player hits a subset of a target region in a short
time, does not leave a certain larger region, and stays in the target region for a long time. This is
done by identifying an auxiliary process that is a supermartingale, and using the optional stopping
theorem. Finally, a coupling with a supercritical oriented site percolating is exhibited where the
open sites in the percolation process are identified with regions of coexistence in the spatial game.
Some continuity arguments and time rescaling extend the result to the parameter region described
by the theorem, where the function m(a12, a21) arises from the time rescaling.
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